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Utah Code, Ann. § 78A-4-103(2) 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code, Ann. § 78A-4-103(2). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court adequately articulate its findings of facts and conclusions of law 
for the issues adjudicated in the case? 
Standard of Review: Because this is a question of law, it is reviewed for 
correctness. 
"The appellant must show legal error by the trial court in its use of fixed principles 
and rules of law, demonstrating the trial court incorrectly selected, interpreted, or 
applied the law." See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994).1 
2. Did the trial court err in ordering that the parties must continue ACAFS Exchange 
services? 
Standard of Review: The principal standard for reviewing this issue is for an abuse 
of discretion by the trial court. 
"The appellant must show the trial court exceeded the measure of discretion 
allotted or exceeded the boundaries set by principles or rules of law." See Utah 
County v. Butler, 2006 UT App 444,17, 147 P.3d 963.2 
1
 Husband refers reader to this language for all subsequent issues involving questions of 
law as a standard of review. 
2
 Husband refers reader to this language for all subsequent issues involving abuse of 
discretion as a standard of review. 
^ 
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3. 
( 
parameters of Rule53 and that has no specific reference to a stipulation on the 
record? 
Standard of Review: This issue is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. 
4. Did the trial court err in denying Husband's3 right to first refusal of surrogate care 
and in ordering him to pay for extended daycare fees? 
Standard of Review: The principal standard for reviewing this issue is for an abuse 
of discretion by the trial court. 
5. Did the trial court err in grouping private kindergarten fees with daycare fees and 
ordering the Husband to pay for such fees? 
Standard of Review: The principal standard for reviewing this issue is for an abuse 
of discretion by the trial court. 
6. Did the trial court correctly limit the Husband's right of first refusal to periods of 
surrogate care longer than three (3) hours? 
Standard of Review: The principal standard for reviewing this issue is for an abuse 
of discretion by the trial court. 
7. Did the trial court disturb the parties stipulation regarding daycare use in the 
future? 
Standard of Review: This issue is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. 
3
 Pursuant to Rule 24(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Respondent/Appellant 
refers to himself hereafter as "Husband" and to Petitioner/Appellee as "Wife." 
fs 
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8. Did the trial court err in ordering summer parenting time4 for Husband that is 
inconsistent with Utah Code §30-3-35(2)(e)(ii)(B)? 
Similarly, did the trial court err in denying Husband's motion to amend this 
decision by reason of res judicata? 
Standard of Review: This issue is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. 
9. Did the trial court rightfully deny Husband's request that Wife pay half the 
mortgage payments/credits on the marital home when it was vacant? 
Standard of Review: The principal standard for reviewing this issue is for an abuse 
of discretion by the trial court. 
10. Did the trial court err in awarding wife $3500, for a purported "dissipation" of the 
marital home asset? 
Standard of Review: The principal standard for reviewing this issue is for an abuse 
of discretion by the trial court. 
11. Did the court err in regulating the Husband's speech with his ecclesiastical 
leaders and employers? 
Standard of Review: This issue is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. 
12. Did the court err in awarding attorney fees for the wife in the amount of $4000? 
Standard of Review: The principal standard for reviewing this issue is for an abuse 
of discretion by the trial court. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
4
 Utah Code §30-3-35 refers to this as time when "school is not in session" so that it 
expresses inclusion of holiday times during the school year. However, for grammatical 
facility, Husband refers to this as "summer parenting time." 
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i 
United States Constitution, Amendment 1: Freedom, Press, Expression 
Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-34 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-35 
Rule 53, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Background and Nature of the Case 
The parties were married in April, 2001. Wife was a graduate from the full-time 
Brigham Young University (BYU) MBA program and worked as an executive for 
Citibank at the time of the marriage. Husband had worked alternately as an instructor or 
technical writer. The parties have two children, including one daughter born on May 23, 
2002, and one son, born on July 12, 2004. On August 9, 2005, Wife took children, left the 
marital home in Pleasant Grove, Utah, and filed for legal separation. Husband was not 
apprised of wife's plan to leave or to take children from the marital home at any time 
before separation. (TT5 at 413). 
During the course of the marriage, Husband was the primary caregiver for the 
daughter from April 2003 until April 2004. Husband was also an equal caregiver to one 
or both children an additional year, at various times. Wife resumed the role of primary 
caregiver approximately one (1) year before leaving with the children in August, 2005 for 
Provo, Utah. 
8 
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In September, 2005, Husband placed the marital home up for sale by owner and 
moved to Provo to be near his children, in hopes of seeing them and caring for them in a 
fashion more congruent to his role before separation. 
After temporary orders were issued on or about March, 2006, Husband was 
ordered to pay future mortgage payments on the home; it was subsequently rented to 
provide payment for this obligation. Wife returned to full-time employment as an 
executive manager and enrolled both children in extended-time daycare with Adventure 
Time Daycare in October, 2006. 
On or about April 2007, Husband took medical disability leave from his employer 
and subsequently received two surgeries, performed by Dr. Howard Reichman, a 
neurologist in Provo, Utah. 
While Husband was on disability, Husband's employer sold off the division in 
which he worked to another corporation, and Husband was subsequently laid off from his 
employment as part of the transition. Husband applied for unemployment benefits and 
received them while he searched and applied for work. In September, 2008 Husband 
found employment as a Communications Instructor for Brigham Young University. 
Commencing with Husband's medical leave on or about April 2007, Husband 
sought to provide daily care for his children in lieu of extended-time daycare. Wife 
opposed the arrangement and enlisted third parties into the judicial proceedings, 
including Ms. Kaydeen Jensen from ACAFS (who directs an exchange service the parties 
had started to use, and who is married to the custody evaluator who had been previously 
Q 
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appointed in the case), as well as the former director of the daycare facility, Ms. Joanne 
Francis. (R. 358). 
Though both third parties had extremely cursory, if any, acquaintance with 
Husband, both women provided Wife, at her request, with letters to submit to the trial 
court, supporting Wife's position of extended-time daycare over father care. (TT5 at 476-
7; Petitioner's trial Exhibit 36). 
Over the next two years, the Husband's efforts to seek his right to first refusal in 
caring for his children, in lieu of extended-time surrogate care, as well as payment for 
such surrogate care, became the chief dispute among the parties. (R. 320 to 2297). 
In March, 2008, the parties fashioned a parent time agreement that provided 
Husband with more overnight parenting time—approximately 12-13 nights per month, on 
average. 
On or about January, 2009, Wife made false accusations to Husband's employer, 
B YU, and caused that he be put under university investigation by formally lodging the 
accusations with three executive administrators of the university, including the 
administrator in charge of terminations. (TT5 at 408). Wife's counsel also perpetuated the 
false accusations in a pleading to the trial court. (R. 1485). 
In April of 2009, the renters from the marital home were vacated and the marital 
home was put up for sale again. The home sold on or about October, 2009, and the 
proceeds were placed into an escrow account to be divided at trial. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition at Trial 
10 
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The parties separated on August 9,2005. Temporary orders were issued in March, 
2006, approximately six (6) months after both parties had left the marital home. The 
temporary orders granted the Wife physical custody of the children and both parties joint-
legal custody. Husband was assigned statutory visitation. The temporary orders also 
assigned Husband with responsibility for future payments on the marital home. 
1. ACAFS Proceedings 
In August 2006, Wife filed an Order to Show Cause in the commissioner's court, 
seeking an order to secure ACAFS exchange services. Wife asserted that Husband had 
been "physically abusive." (R. 223, f 51). Years later, in both her deposition and at trial, 
Wife recanted, and admitted that Husband had never been violent at any time. (TT5 at 
389). Wife made numerous other accusations that Husband disputed and continues to 
dispute. 
2. Daycare Proceedings 
Beginning in May 2007, and until the time of trial, Wife began filing numerous 
petitions for orders to show cause in the commissioner's court, requesting that Husband's 
parental right of first refusal be revoked. In these petitions, Wife presented accusations, 
including hearsay, outside of standards pursuant to evidentiary rules. Husband has 
categorically denied these accusations. 
Husband has asserted that Wife's counsel repeatedly mischaracterized the 
stipulations and rulings in his forms of the orders resulting from these proceedings. 
Husband has objected to the forms of the orders. 
11 
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4 
On May 10, 2007, the parties stipulated in the commissioner's court that Husband 
would provide daily care for the children beginning May 25, 2007 and that neither party { 
would unilaterally enroll the children into daycare again. Wife's counsel was assigned to 
prepare the form of the order but he took more than two months to do so. When the form 
i 
was provided to Husband's counsel, it mischaracterized the proceeding, including 
omitting the stipulation of the parties not to enroll the children into daycare again 
unilaterally. Husband's counsel objected to the form of the order on July 25, 2007. (R. 
383). 
The lack of a written order on this hearing was addressed at trial by Husband's
 { 
counsel, who presented the trial court with a CD of the recording of the commissioner's 
hearing for this date. The trial court pledged to take judicial notice of the trial recording 
i 
but seemingly did not actually listen to the recording before making a ruling regarding 
the daycare or private kindergarten issues. The trial court appears to have 
misapprehended the exact language of the stipulation. (TT6 at 693-4). j 
In August 2007, Wife unilaterally re-enrolled son into Adventure Time extended-
time daycare and daughter into Adventure Time private kindergarten,5 in violation of the 
stipulation from May 10, 2007. Husband was unemployed and expecting to continue his 
care for the children. 
5
 Wife alternately calls the private kindergarten "school" and "daycare" throughout the 
record. For purposes of collecting re-imbursements from Husband, it was called 
"daycare." For purposes of arguing its superiority and benefits over father care, it was 
called "private kindergarten." Similarly, Wife refers to son's daycare as "preschool" 
when arguing its benefits over father care. 
12 
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Wife subsequently petitioned an order to show cause, claiming that Husband was 
not reliable in providing care over the summer (without specific references or evidence). 
Wife also offered other hearsay-based accusations. During the subsequent trial, however, 
Wife provided different reasoning for unilaterally enrolling children into daycare, stating 
that the difficulty in performing ACAFS exchange services, which the parties were 
ordered to do at her petitioning, formed the basis for her decision. (TT5 403-5). Husband 
asserted that the accusations regarding any failure or wrongdoing on his part are false. 
On September 12, 2007, the parties attended an order to show cause hearing and 
the commissioner ruled that the mother had the right to enroll the daughter in "private 
kindergarten," even though its extended-duration, sometimes exceeding nine (9) hours in 
duration, precluded Husband for caring for his daughter altogether. 
However, the commissioner also ruled that Husband would not be responsible for 
costs of the private school. The commissioner further ruled that Husband would not be 
responsible for Adventure Time costs for the son if Husband cared for son during the day. 
The commissioner did not address Wife's violation of the stipulation from May 
10, 2007, regarding her actions to unilaterally enroll the children into daycare. Wife 
subsequently kept the son enrolled at Adventure Time, even though Husband cared for 
son on a daily basis, all day. This resulted in redundant daycare costs in addition to the 
private kindergarten costs, which were assessed to Husband at the conclusion of trial. 
Husband asserted that Wife's counsel again mischaracterized the proceeding and 
rulings of this hearing in his proposed form of the order. However, the minutes of the 
hearing clearly reflect the aforementioned rulings. (R. 530; Add. Doc. 1). 
11 
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Wife kept both children enrolled at Adventure Time Daycare from October 2006 
until approximately June 2009. From October 2006 until June 2007 (when Husband 
began providing daily care), the parties' children averaged approximately 10 hours of 
daycare per day, and Husband paid his monthly daycare fees every month directly to 
Adventure Time. There is no dispute among the parties regarding daycare expenses for 
any period preceding June 2007. 
From August 2007 until June 2009, Wife kept son enrolled in Adventure Time 
even as he was enrolled in a second "preschool" at BYU (TT6 at 717). Further, Husband 
also cared for him—when he was permitted. Husband asserted that he repeatedly 
demonstrated his willingness and availability to care for both children at all times, and 
never missed the opportunity to do so in the two years between losing his employment 
and the trial date.6 
During these years, the parties' daughter spent long hours in the Adventure Time 
daycare facility while the son was with Husband. Throughout the daughter's entire first 
grade year, she was dropped off at daycare before school, bussed to school, then bussed 
back to daycare at the end of school and then cared for by two teenage boys within the 
facility until nightfall. Again, during this time, Husband was caring for his son in his 
home. Husband asserted that he also desired to care for his daughter and expressed such 
numerous times. 
6
 Husband had surgery on two days in the summer of 2007, shortly before being laid off. 
On these two days, Husband apprised wife approximately two weeks before his surgery 
and offered the services of his sister to care for the children. Wife refused, then claimed 
in her OSC petition that Husband was "unreliable" in providing care, despite his caring 
for the parties' children every other day throughout the entire summer. 
14 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3. "Therapist" Proceedings 
On or about December 2007, Wife began taking the parties' children to Mr. Stuart 
Harper7, a purported "play therapist" who was referred to her by her counsel, Mr. Ron 
Wilkinson. Wife took children without Husband's knowledge or consent. Mr. Harper 
began practicing unconventional "therapies" on the parties' children. 
In June , 2008, Wife petitioned an order to show cause in which Mr. Harper 
asserted to be the children's practicing therapist. Wife sought re-imbursement from 
Husband for Mr. Harper's fees. The commissioner's court recommended that Wife be 
given the fees for the counseling. (R. 861). 
Upon objection, however, the trial court ruled on December 15, 2008, that 
Husband was not required to pay the fees. (R. 1435). 
Husband subpoenaed Mr. Harper's records. At this point, Wife's counsel began 
representing Mr. Harper (though no notice of appearance was filed); Wife's counsel then 
filed a motion to quash the subpoena on behalf of Mr. Harper. (R. 1244). 
During an evidentiary hearing on the matter on January 21, 2009, the trial court 
denied the motion to quash the subpoena. (R. 1551). Mr. Harper then produced 
incomplete records of his counseling sessions with the parties' children. 
On March 19, 2009, Wife designated Mr. Harper as a witness to testify about his 
"role as a therapist for the children." Then Wife subsequently designated him as an 
"expert witness" after he had previously purported to be a practicing therapist for the 
7Both Wife and Wife's counsel repeatedly refer to Mr. Harper as "Dr. Harper" in trial and 
in the record. However, Mr. Harper has neither a doctorate, nor a medical degree. 
15 
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{ 
children. However, Mr. Harper never appeared in court—despite being subpoenaed—to 
face examination regarding his practices, records, educational credentials, observations, 
or opinions. 
4. Child Support Proceedings 
Child support is not an issue in this appeal; however, the proceedings are relevant 
to the questions of equity that should have been applied in an analysis for dividing the 
marital home asset or any other equity consideration. 
Husband lost income, and subsequently employment, starting in April 2007. 
Husband did not receive a modification of child support until December 15, 2008. (R. 
1435). However, this modification substantially undercounted Husband's overnights and 
Husband was still overpaying his obligation by hundreds of dollars each month. The 
existing order for support was not filed until June 4, 2010 (more than a year after the trial 
began). 
After Husband was involuntarily terminated, he collected unemployment 
compensation from November 2007 until August 2008. Husband maintained child 
support payments from April 2007 until December 15, 2008 that approximated or often 
exceeded his total gross income. During this time, Husband also maintained all mortgage 
and marital debt payments and expenses on the marital home. Also, during this time, 
Wife's income had a increased to $5333 per month. Wife contributed no monies and 
almost no efforts to the marital home during this time or at anytime after leaving the 
home without notice. (TT6 at 390). 
16 
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5. Disposition at Trial 
Approximately one year before trial, in March 2008, the parties stipulated to 
having Husband increase the amount of parental overnights with the parties' children. 
At trial, 15, 2009, Wife opened her arguments by seeking sole physical custody of 
the parties' children, with minimum visitation rights for husband, because of—as she 
asserted—a "high conflict" relationship between the parties. In subsequent trial sessions, 
Wife eventually stipulated to a parenting arrangement similar, if not exact, to the one 
existing since March 2008, which is what Husband sought in his opening arguments. 
At the conclusion of trial, the trial court awarded daycare costs to Wife, dating 
back to August 2007. The trial court also awarded private kindergarten costs, dating back 
to the same time period. The trial court ordered the continued services of ACAFS 
exchanges; the services of a special master; a limitation to Husband's right of first refusal 
to periods of three (3) or hours or more; the right of Wife to use Adventure Time daycare 
in the future; an award of $3500 to Wife for dissipation of the marital home asset; an 
award of $4000 to Wife for attorney fees; and that summer parenting time for Husband 
be according to Utah Code §30-3-35. The trial court also denied Husband's request for 
re-imbursement of mortgage payments or credits he paid on the marital home when it was 
vacant. 
6. Post Trial Procedings 
In September 2009, Wife's counsel submitted a form of the trial order. Husband's 
counsel objected to the order. Husband was over-ruled on almost all points. Wife's 
counsel subsequently submitted numerous forms for the Special Master Order, to which 
17 
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Husband repeatedly objected. All deliberations and proceedings regarding the Special 
Master Order were conducted off the record by the trial court. The trial court signed a 
Special Master Order on June 4, 2010, more than one year after the trial began. Husband 
timely filed his Notice of Appeal for both the trial and special master orders. 
On May 12, 2010, Husband filed an Affidavit of Impecuniosity. 
On August 30, 2010, the parties attended a hearing regarding Husband's motion to 
amend the summer parenting times in the findings and order. Husband sought that his 
summer parenting times match those specifically provided in Utah Code §30-3-35. 
Although the motion was timely filed, it was barred by res judicata. 
On September 1, 2010, the trial court ruled Husband to be impecunious. (R. 2247; 
Add. Doc. 2). 
On April 11,2011, Husband filed a motion before the trial court seeking relief 
from ACAFS exchanges, improper special master fees, and extended parent time. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The issues presented for appeal in this brief are expansive and varyingly complex; 
because of their long history, they are not easily summarized. However, they can be 
grouped into three main categories: (1) issues involving third-parties for purported "high 
conflict" domestic cases, (2) issues involving parenting time and right to first refusal of 
surrogate care, and (3) issues involving equitable marital distributions and considerations. 
In the first category, Husband asserts that the court abused its discretion in 
ordering the parties to continue using ACAFS exchange services. It also failed to follow 
the law in producing a Special Master Order. 
18 
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In the second category, Husband argues that the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying Husband's right of first refusal of surrogate care and ordering payment for 
expensive extended-time daycare based on an unreasonable conclusion. It also abused its 
discretion in grouping private school costs with daycare costs. The trial court also 
improperly applied Utah Code, Ann. §30-3-35 for Husband's summer parenting time. 
Further, the trial court disturbed a stipulation of the parties regarding daycare use and it 
also was unreasonable in limiting Husband's right to first refusal in the future. 
In the third category, Husband argues that the trial court abused its discretion in 
distributing the proceeds from the marital homes in two ways: (1) it improperly denied 
Husband the mortgage credits he paid, and (2) it improperly awarded "dissipation of 
asset" sums for the Wife. The trial court also improperly awarded attorney fees for the 
Wife. 
Husband also argues one issue outside of these categories: that the trial court 
entered an unconstitutional regulation on speech for the parties that limits Husband's 
ability to defend himself from previous false accusation. 
Additionally, in all of these issues, Husband asserts that the trial court failed to 
present adequate findings of facts and conclusions of law. 
8
 Husband also contends that extended-time daycare is itself an economically-interested 
third party in this case, and in similar fashion to the others, provides a solution for a 
problem caused by another expensive third party. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ADEQUATELY ARTICULATE ITS 
FINDINGS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW FOR THE ISSUES 
ADJUDICATED IN THIS CASE. 
Standard of Review: Question of Law 
In this case, the trial court has not issued its findings of fact and conclusions of 
law separately from its parenting order. In summarizing and presenting the rulings of the 
trial court, it has condensed the entirety of its expressions into a single document, 
currently captioned as Third Amended Findings and Order, hereafter referred to as "the 
Divorce Order." (R. 2268; Add. Doc. 3). However, in doing so, the trial court has 
presented only the sparse ingredients of findings of fact and conclusions of law in 
scattershot fashion throughout its document. 
Husband argues this as an issue unto itself, in a preliminary fashion—despite its 
relevance to all other subsequently-presented issues—because of its effects upon the 
duties of the Husband in this brief. These duties include (1) identifying the standards of 
review for the appellate court, and (2) marshalling the evidence in favor of the trial 
court's decision .9 
9
 Husband acknowledges, as a pro se litigant, that he is inexperienced in legal training, 
and that the organizational and analytical requirements for an appellant's brief are 
daunting. The lack of any formal or organized presentations of the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law only compound the difficulty and onus on the Husband to identify 
those issues involving a challenge to the trial court's findings, not to mention the 
marshalling requirements for such contexts. 
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In addressing the requirement to identify the standards of review, the Husband is 
left to depend upon a clear presentation of the findings of facts, the basis for finding such 
facts, their relevance to the issue, and the legal analysis leading to conclusions of law. 
But Husband is impaired by the nature of the presentation of findings in the 
parties' Divorce Order. Previous case law has found that a trial court fails in adequately 
presenting its findings when it does "not explain either the factual basis or the legal 
analysis supporting its determinations and, consequently, do[es] not provide this court 
with enough information to allow a meaningful review." See Leppert v. Leppert, 2009 UT 
App 10, \ 20, 200 P.3d 1137. Husband argues that the Divorce Order lacks these 
elements, and that Husband is therefore limited in his ability to identify the correct 
standard of review for each issue because of said omissions. 
Regarding the marshalling of evidence, this Court has found that when "the 
findings are legally inadequate, the exercise of marshalling the evidence supporting the 
findings becomes futile and appellant need not marshal." See Williamson v. Williamson, 
1999 UT App 219, % 8 n.2, 983 P.2d 1103. Husband argues that marshalling the evidence 
for relevant issues in this brief is a futile endeavor due to such defects. 
Further, in this case, when findings are mentioned in the trial court's order, they 
are often inserted by the Wife's counsel, who prepared the order, and they sometimes 
have no reference to any language by the Court in its ruling at the conclusion of the trial, 
nor to any reference on the record. In other cases, the mentioning of a finding is a 
mischaracterization of facts that the trial court never even addressed. 
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This Court has concluded that the "absence of adequate findings of fact is a 
fundamental defect that warrants reversal unless the record is clear and uncontroverted 
such to allow appellate court to apply statutory factors as a matter of law on appeal." See 
Mark v. Mark, 2009 UT App 374, f 9, 223 P.3d 476. As such, Husband argues that the 
issues adjudicated by the trial court should be reversed to the trial court to fulfill such 
requirements, as well as remanded for further proceedings due to these errors. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PARTIES TO 
CONTINUE ACAFS EXCHANGE SERVICES. 
Standard of Review: Abuse of Discretion 
On this issue, the trial court heard testimony and considered the Wife's argument 
that the parties should continue to utilize and pay for ACAFS services, which provides 
"supervised" exchanges (though the parties have lived within 1.5 miles of each other in 
West Provo since October, 2005). ACAFS is directed by Ms. Kaydeen Jensen. The trial 
court found that the service was "beneficial for the parties and had been successful in 
helping the parties communicate and limiting any potential emotional issues between the 
parties at pick-up and drop-off." (R. 2268; Add. Doc. 3, f 6). 
At the conclusion of the trial on July 16, 2009, the trial court stated that it found 
ACAFS useful and appropriate, based upon the testimony of Dr. Jensen (who is the 
organizational head of ACAFS, and the court-appointed custody evaluator), and that of 
his wife Ms. Jensen (who is the director of ACAFS). The trial court stated that it made 
such a decision because 
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there's ample evidence, compelling evidence that causes the Court to conclude that 
the parties have a high conflict relationship that has seriously deterred their ability 
to communicate and work out even simple adjustments to their schedules. 
(TT6at806). 
The trial court further noted that "there's been a history of high conflict, an inability to 
communicate, to make adjustments to schedules, even ACAFS spoke to that difficulty. 
(TT6at813). 
In addition to challenging the adequacy of the findings on this issue, Husband 
asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in two substantial and prejudicial ways: (1) 
it ignored its own inter alia stipulation, which stipulation foreclosed Husband's 
presentation of testimony on the issue, and (2) it improperly relied upon the facile 
convention of labeling the parties as "high conflict" without engaging in requisite 
analysis for the label or for the determinations resulting from the use of that label. 
The trial courts' errors include interrupting and stopping the Husband's testimony 
regarding the ACAFS exchange issue. The trial court then immediately conducted an off-
the-record session in which it stated that a special master would be appointed in lieu of 
ACAFS exchanges. It also stated that the parents could follow the Husband's suggestion 
to begin "curb-side exchanges" (explained in the following testimony). The trial court 
then conducted an on-the-record discussion referencing its initial decision to begin curb-
This is, in fact, an ambiguous reference used by the trial court in that it is not clear if it 
is referencing Ms. Jensen, who is the director of ACAFS, or Dr. Jensen, who is the 
custody evaluator, and who is also the head of the ACAFS organization. Such is the 
incestuous nature of the testimony used as the basis for the trial court's decision. 
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side exchanges and to use a special master in lieu of ACAFS exchange services. The trial 
court then adjourned for the day. < 
Then, two months later, when proceedings resumed, and the ruling was issued by 
the trial court, the court completely forgot that it had established a preliminary decision 
to substitute curb-side exchanges and a special master for ACAFS exchanges—in fact, it 
had forgotten any reference to a special master whatsoever—while effectively precluding 
Husband from fully testifying of the burdens and conflicts of using ACAFS. 
The events from the record proceed as follows: 
Stopping the Testimony of Husband Regarding Burdens of ACAFS Exchanges:
 ( 
May 20, 2009 
Q Yeah. Do you have concerns with having continued—with continuing to have < 
exchanges at A.C.A.F.S.? 
A Yes. It's—it's onerous. It's very onerous. It's onerous on the children, especially. 
It's—you know, I can say that it's financially onerous, it really is, and it's 
onerous because we have to go to—we live a mile apart and we end up having, 
you know, it takes 45 minutes to do an exchange, to drive across town and so < 
forth and back, but the real—real thing is the kids. The kids—a lot has been 
made here about the difficulty of transitions and the transitions really should— 
should be what we—the children could have such an easier transition, just 
going from parent to parent or, you know, some place close, rather than having 
to go through a procedure, a different sort of process that's—that's been going 
on for, you know, a number of years. They don't—they don't appreciate it, they 
don't like having to drive over there and they don't like the process. 
Q Okay. Are the children old enough to have curb side exchanges where neither 
you nor Anna have to interact with one another? 
A Yeah. In fact, what we-we've done it a number of times recently. 
Q And how do you envision that would work? 
A Well, my understanding is there's a process called curb side exchange, which 
we've never actually had—had followed, and the curb side exchange is simply 
that the children get out of the car, they're old enough to carry their things and 
they—and one person stays either in the house, the other person stays in the car 
or right by the car, and the children go from one car to another, or a car to the 
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house. And the children--you know, the parents donft need to exchange words 
or anything like that. And I think that's something that would work. 
THE COURT: I'm going to-may I interrupt you, Mr. Anderson? 
MR. ANDERSON: Yes. 
THE COURT: We'll--I just want you to take two minutes to stretch our legs and 
Td like to visit with counsel just outside the door. 
You can step down. 
(Recess) 
(TT5 at 526-528). 
Discussion Referencing Initial Decision to Cease ACAFS Exchanges: May 20, 2009 
THE COURT: But the idea-what I was suggesting in our discussion was 
that perhaps the parties could agree to a curb side drop off and pick up with 
the assistance of a special master, I didn't see how they could do that 
without one. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Yeah. 
THE COURT: So that they may not need the assistance of A.C.A.F.S. if 
they have the ability to communicate. 
MR. WILKINSON: Wefd be willing to turn that decision over to the special 
master. 
THE COURT: All right. But you would~am I given to understand that you 
would agree not to employ A.C.A.F.S. in the future? 
MR. WILKINSON: We would leave that up to the special master. 
THE COURT: Yeah. And-if--if you have problems? 
MR. WILKINSON: If therefs a need, correct. 
THE COURT: Okay. So, initially, you would not employ A.C.A.F.S. and 
you would attempt this curb side with the assistance of a special master for 
scheduling. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Your Honor, we would ask that if there's a--thatfs a 
pretty global change, that if there—if one of the parties thinks A.C.A.F.S. 
needs to be involved, we would expect that to come before the Court and I 
would expect that the special master would— 
THE COURT: I'd have to agree. That's a large-presumably, a large 
expense. 
(TT5 at 547-548). 
It is important to note that the discussion referenced above follows the testimony 
of Dr. Jensen—clearly indicating that the trial court desired to cease ACAFS exchanges 
and begin curbside exchanges regardless of anything that might be interpreted from Dr. 
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Jensen's ambiguous oral testimony on the subject (not to be confused with Dr. Jensen's 
written recommendation, which more clearly recommend terminating ACAFS ' 
exchanges). (R. 2290). It is also important to note that the trial court specifically 
established that special care should be taken if the special master should ever recommend 
< 
that ACAFS exchanges resume because ordering both third-party charges would be "a 
large expense." 
Memory Lapse and Ruling of Trial Court on ACAFS Exchanges Two Months 
Later: July 16, 2009 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: . . . And-and we think it would be appropriate for
 { 
the Court, to the extent there's a concern, to have [special master] Mr. 
Jackman aid the parties in making decisions over parent time issues. There's 
no reason to lock these children up in a situation where they can't see their 
parents unless they have to schedule and—and wait for A.C.A.F.S. to be 
available. We've heard testimony today that's a stressful— < 
THE COURT: This is the first I've heard of a suggestion of a special 
master. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: We asked— 
THE COURT: Is there a reason why we haven't discussed that earlier? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Well— < 
THE COURT: Fm just—I mean, we're here at closing after six days of 
trial— 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Yeah. 
THE COURT: -I 'm just quite surprised that that hasn't been discussed. Had 
it been agreed to considered, we might not have heard much of this. ' 
(TT6 at 799-800). 
THE COURT:.. . And I am persuaded that the use of A.C.A.F.S. has been 
beneficial and-and useful and appropriate. I am persuaded at this late hour, 
that it would be beneficial to have Rick Jackman involved. He has much 
experience in these matters, I think he could do a lot to facilitate this 
process. I had—I kind of wish that would have been addressed earlier. I'm 
persuaded, given the history and the evidence I've heard, that A.C.A.F.S. , 
should continue.. . . 
(TT6 at 806). 
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It is clear that the trial court forgot its discussion two months earlier of curbside 
exchanges and its interruption of Husband's testimony. Whether the discussion on May 
20, 2009, constitutes the legal definition of a judicial decision, or even a stipulation, is 
not what matters here. What matters is that the Husband was—based upon the actions of 
the trial court—prevented from presenting his full testimony regarding the 
inappropriateness ACAFS exchanges. 
And that is not an inconsequential error, because the few lines of testimony the 
Husband was permitted to offer was the only testimony in six days of trial that was 
compelling enough to have the trial court stop the testimony, proceed to an off-the-record 
meeting and suggest the very thing the Husband had suggested, and then reference the 
very matter as an initial agreement. 
Further, the error is compounded because the trial court then ordered the use of a 
special master in addition to ACAFS exchanges—the very situation it warned against in 
previous discussions as especially onerous for the parties as a "large expense." Yet 
further, the trial court ordered all such services without any consideration of the parties' 
finances, especially the Husband, who was left impecunious by the trial court's decisions. 
The errors in this issue could not have led to serious and unnecessary hardship for the 
Husband. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PRODUCING A SPECIAL MASTER 
ORDER THAT EXCEEDS THE PARAMETERS OF RULE 53 AND THAT 
HAS NO SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE RECORD. 
Standard of Review: Question of Law 
A. Adequacy of Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law 
Husband cannot find language identifying the trial court's findings of facts and 
conclusions of law for ordering a special master with exceptional powers for parent time 
disputes.11 Husband hereby references the case law cited in the first issue of this brief, 
regarding adequacy of the findings of facts and conclusions of law for all issues presented 
in this brief. 
B. Purported Stipulation Is Not Valid 
The Special Master Order states that it is "based upon stipulation of the parties." 
See Special Master Order. (R. 2182; Add. Doc. 4). The only appearance of a stipulation 
on the record is one which was offered by Husband's counsel with the understanding that 
such an order would be in lieu of ACAFS exchange services. See transcript extract from 
Discussion Referencing Initial Decision to Cease ACAFS Exchanges: May 20, 2009 in 
previous argument. But the trial court did not order it in lieu of ACAFS exchanges; it 
ordered it in addition to ACAFS exchanges. Removing the ACAFS exchanges was the 
11
 Husband acknowledges that the parties have previously stipulated to a special master to 
help on the subject of choosing a therapist for the children, should such a need a rise. But 
Husband asserts that he has not stipulated to a special master to anything more than this, 
unless it is in consideration for using such services in lieu of ACAFS exchanges, and then 
only according to Rule 53 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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essence of any stipulation on the matter and removing the carrot that enticed Husband 
into any offer to stipulate constitutes an abuse of discretion by the trial court. 
Further, Husband is not trained in legal matters, but his experience with previous 
stipulations suggests to him that a party must actually be sufficiently told of the details of 
a proposed stipulation and agree to it before it is valid. Husband has not done this in any 
way, shape, or form. Husband disputes that any language or proceeding on this matter has 
included the necessary legal elements to constitute a "stipulation." 
C. Special Master Order is Not Pursuant to Rule 53 
Although the Special Master Order states that it is "pursuant to Rule 53, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure," it is, in fact, not. Rule 53 states 
(c) Powers. The order of reference to the master may . . . fix the time and place for 
beginning and closing the hearings and for the filing of the master's report. Subject 
to the specifications and limitations stated in the order, the master has and shall 
exercise the power to regulate all proceedings in every hearing before him . . . . 
Here, the language of Rule 53 clearly identifies the role of the special master to 
conduct "hearings" and "file reports." However, the Special Master Order for the parties 
grants this special master to make "decisions," to make them "orally" and to make them 
"binding." While Rule 53 establishes the purpose of the master to "gather" evidence 
through legal "hearings" (or at least quasi-legal proceedings) and to "report" 
recommendations to the court, the order for the parties appears an attempt to circumvent 
the entire operations and jurisdiction of the trial court. (R. 2182; Add. Doc. 4). 
With the current Special Master Order, one might imagine a special master simply 
making a couple of phone calls and ordering the parties to a specific performance without 
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gathering any evidence according to legal rules, without reporting recommendations to 
the trial court—which is the central purpose of a special master—or without even filing a 
report. This is not an order for a special master; rather, it seems to be an attempt to 
outsource a legal system to third-parties who may not feel bound by any legal rules 
whatsoever and who charge $250 per hour to the parties to adjudicate the issues. 
Further, the Special Master Order contains other provisions inequitable to the 
parties. Specifically, the Special Master Order establishes that the cost for the master 
should be split among the parties. The special master in this case charges $250 per hour. 
In essence, the party who creates conflict can cause the other party to incur 
thousands of dollars in fees for the most trivial of issues. This has already happened in 
1 9 
this case. Wife's counsel currently operates under the impression that he may call the 
special master and engage him on any subject that he desires and impoverish the Husband 
as much as he cares through such actions. Husband is impecunious but has been charged 
for nearly one thousand dollars in fees already, despite the fact that the special master has 
not had to make any decisions for the parties—even according to the criteria of the 
expanded order that imputes him exceptional powers. 
D. Errors in the Proceedings 
Husband asserts that errors in the "proceedings" resulted in an abuse of discretion. 
Husband uses the term "proceedings" loosely, as there is scant language on the record 
regarding what provisions should be included in a Special Master Order (except, of 
12
 On April 11,2011, Husband filed his Motion for Relief Regarding ACAFS, Special 
Master Fees, and Extended Parent Time. This motion details these actions. 
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course, in the proceeding that established the master in lieu of ACAFS, which was 
subsequently disregarded by the trial court). 
The trial court signed and issued this order on June 4, 2010, more than a year after 
the beginning of the trial. The parties had no parenting time disputes before the trial court 
during this year. The trial court conducted all communication off the record regarding the 
matter. The trial court instructed counsel for the Husband to approve the form of the 
order after multiple objections to its form. Husband's counsel approved the form of the 
order after numerous objections and only under the directions of the trial court, which 
were made off the record. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING HUSBAND'S RIGHT TO 
FIRST REFUSAL OF SURROGATE CARE AND IN ORDERING HIM TO 
PAY FOR EXTENDED DAYCARE FEES. 
Standard of Review: Abuse of Discretion 
A. Adequacy of Factual Findings and Conclusions of Law 
In issuing its ruling, the trial court provided only the following language regarding 
its decision to award daycare costs to the Wife and to disregard Husband's right of first 
refusal: 
THE COURT: 
Okay. Next, the question of Adventure Time. There's a lot been said about 
Adventure Time. I do appreciate the-and understand the issues. I do note that of 
great, I think of some significance is that after Adventure Time was employed, 
even arguably unilaterally, the parties were in Court before the Commissioner 
within three months and do not speak to the Commissioner as to why they're even 
there. Adventure Time was useful, beneficial and appropriate for day care, and 
necessary. I'm unpersuaded that the defendant offered a practical response to the 
needs of day care, given the petitioner's employment at the time. It result-it really 
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I 
contemplated too much shuffling of the children and was impractical. Seemingly 
the respondent waived his complaint and acquiesced to it; therefore, I am going to 
award day care~the Adventure Time day care costs, but an offset of some portion, 
given your calculations and his participation and award the sum of $5,000. 
(TT6at807). 
The trial court does not include any explanation as to why daycare represents less 
"shuffling of the children" than delivering the children to their father, who lives 1.5 miles 
from the mother. The Wife worked at BYU, as did the Husband, who, after a season of 
unemployment, worked as an instructor with flexible hours. The trial court failed to 
express how a vaguely referenced inconvenience in getting to work at this particular 
workplace—BYU—was somehow a great impediment for her when Husband managed to 
do it nearly everyday from his own home. 
Nevertheless, the record clearly shows that Husband was willing to take any 
measures or go to any location to pick up his children to care for them during the day for 
the entire time that the children were "unilaterally" enrolled in extended daycare. 
Further, the trial court not only failed to consider the costs to the parties (as 
directed and shown below by Utah Code §30-3-33), but also in a contradictory move, it 
subsequently acknowledged the severe financial distress of the Husband as its next issue 
in the ruling by awarding Husband a retroactive child support credit. (TT6 at 807). 
The trial court also failed to make any connection between a specific factual 
incident and the statement that the Husband "seemingly waived his complaint and 
acquiesced to it." Husband can find nothing on the record to support this astounding 
statement. Husband states such a characterization is simply not true and whatever 
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"seemingly" suggests this must have been interpreted in a grossly mistaken fashion as to 
constitute clear error. Husband has no idea what said event refers to because the trial 
court failed to specify any evidence. The trial court appears to be simply echoing one of 
many false, conclusory remarks made by Wife's counsel in his closing argument, but 
which have little or no correlation to factual events. 
In the Divorce Order, Wife's counsel also inserted a finding that is found neither 
anywhere in the ruling, nor as evidence on the record. It asserts that Husband "interfered 
with daycare." Again, not only is the assertion false, but it has no expressed correlation or 
connection to any event or fact. Here Wife's counsel is simply making another attempt to 
insinuate unspecified, false, hearsay profferings that he used repeatedly in previous 
attempts to revoke Husband's right of first refusal in the commissioner's court. 
With regard to the adequacy of a trial court's factual findings, this Court has stated: 
Failure of the trial court to make findings on all material issues is reversible error 
unless the facts in the record are clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting 
only a finding in favor of the judgment. The findings of fact must show that the 
court's judgment or decree follows logically from, and is supported by, the 
evidence. The findings should be sufficiently detailed and include enough 
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each 
factual issue was reached. 
See Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11,116, 176 P.3d 476. The trial court has 
failed to adequately present findings of fact and conclusions of law on this issue. 
B. Abuse of Discretion 
Husband frankly admits that this issue is the most difficult thing he has ever 
endured, including losing his marriage, his home, his savings, his retirement, his 
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employment, his solvency, and even his health to chronic disease as a result of the very 
distressing false accusations made against him to keep him from caring for his children. 
Husband was a primary caregiver for his children. Husband taught his daughter 
her first word, her first song, and guided her first step. Upon marital separation, Husband 
was involuntarily separated from his children abruptly and without warning and forced 
into a situation in which he was allowed to see his children only eight (8) times per 
month for almost two years. 
Husband has done nothing wrong in any way at any point to merit being separated 
from his children. Husband lived each day, available, and yearning to care for his 
children, even as they spent 10 hours a day in an extended-time daycare facility. The 
record shows that the parties' children often spent more waking hours in extended-time 
daycare than with both parents combined. 
Husband lacks the expressive powers to sufficiently describe the absurdity and 
egregious disregard with which the courts have treated the issue of the Husband's right to 
care for his own children instead of extended daycare. 
Utah code 30-3-34(15) states 
Parental care shall be presumed to be better care for the child than surrogate care 
and the court shall encourage the parties to cooperate in allowing the noncustodial 
parent, if willing and able to transport the children, to provide the child care. Child 
care arrangements existing during the marriage are preferred as are child care 
arrangements with nominal or no charge. 
It is important to note that the trial court's award for daycare costs represented the 
costs for a little over a year. Husband had already contributed an amount approximately 
equal to that before becoming unemployed in September 2007. 
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In awarding $5000 in "Adventure Time" costs to the Wife (which is equivalent to 
approximately 25% of Husband's gross yearly earnings), the trial court has completely 
ignored the statute governing the issue of parental care and surrogate care. The trial court 
has completely disregarded the Husband's right of first refusal. And because the Wife 
violated a court order to not enroll the children in a daycare "unilaterally" after the 
Husband was laid off (and the trial court seems to acknowledges as much in its ruling), 
the trial court has demonstrated disregard for compliance to such orders. (TT6 at 807:11). 
Further, the trial court heard the Wife offer testimony in its own court, admitting 
that Wife had denied Husband his court-appointed parent time by keeping the children in 
the daycare. The trial court not only allowed Wife to repeatedly violate Husband's right 
of first refusal and his court-appointed parent time with impunity, it also rewarded her for 
it. (TT6 at 807). 
The trial court offers no sensible reason for disregarding all of these factors; in 
fact, the scant language it does provides is simply beyond the scope of reasonability. 
C. "High Conflict" Divorce Designations 
The trial court indicated that a decision to order the costly services of third-parties 
was based on the "high conflict" of the parties and their "inability to communicate." 
Herein, Husband argues that this terminology—and its underlying rationale—require 
proper explication so that this Court can understand the trial court's abuse of discretion 
on this and other issues regarding third parties in this brief, specifically the use of special 
masters, daycare, and private school. 
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The words "high conflict" and "unable to communicate" constitute a very 
common pattern of language used in domestic commissioner's courts and by profiteering < 
third-party services in the divorce industries. The thinking goes as follows: if divorcing 
parties are having conflicts regarding their time with their children, then the courts are 
unable to make any reasonable discernment as to who is causing the conflict (without 
expending any effort to actually conclude such); therefore expensive third-party services 
are needed. 
Some of these services, such as the service for a special master, can cost the 
parties as much as $250 per hour, as is the case for the parties in this case. There is a
 ( 
tremendous amount of money to be made on parties who are labeled as "high conflict" or 
"unable to communicate" (and, in perverse irony, are the most financially distressed 
among the population at large). Parents are highly motivated to pay the fees, no matter 
how high, because they risk losing access to their children if they fail to make the 
payments (as explained in subsequent paragraphs). Consequently, there is often < 
tremendous economic pressure to move parties into this category. 
Moreover, attorneys who have long-standing relationships with such third-parties 
have tremendous incentives to move clients into these arrangements, as is true with the 
parties in this case. If attorneys provide payors for the third-party services, they can, in 
return, expect these third-party providers to appear in court and testify on behalf of their 
clients. It is a de facto quid-pro-quo relationship. 
Third-parties also typically recommend additional third-party providers for "high
 { 
conflict" situations. For example, it is common to see exchange services recommend the 
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services of a special master—often a very specific master—who, in turn, recommends 
exchange services. In such fashion, these non-competing third parties form a symbiotic 
strategy that maximizes their revenues from each divorcing party. 
More importantly, parties who calculate surprise separations from their 
spouses, and who seize their children from such spouses, and who thereby easily obtain 
temporary orders for full custody, have tremendous incentive to have their cases 
characterized as "high conflict." As Dr. Jensen noted in his interview with the Husband, 
the courts routinely disallow joint physical custody determinations among "non-custodial 
parents" seeking a shared-parenting arrangement when the parties are labeled "high 
conflict." Thus, there is a perverse incentive for the temporary custodian of the children 
to actually create conflict and undermine all efforts of communication. Husband asserts 
that he endured this very situation for four years previous to the trial. 
In many cases, such as this one, courts are disinclined to make the effort to 
determine violations in domestic cases. As such, they often rely upon these third-parties, 
who have been invited or subpoenaed by their affiliate attorneys, to provide their 
recommendations or opinions to the courts. They provide a packaged vocabulary of 
phrases that courts can easily adopt, often without analysis or specific application. It 
seems to make no difference whether these third parties are actually qualified, 
credentialed, or educated in any manner relevant to the opinions they offer the courts. It 
also does not seem to matter, as in this case, that their testimony is directly built upon 
profound conflicts of interest. 
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In this case, not long after the parties commenced exchanges at ACAFS (at Wife's 
petition), Wife's counsel, Mr. Ron Wilkinson, solicited a letter from Ms. Jensen at 
ACAFS, asking her to offer her opinion on whether Husband should have a right of first 
refusal and whether he should care for the children instead of extended daycare at 
Adventure Time. Despite the fact that Ms. Jensen is not a child psychologist, does not 
have a degree in psychology, nor has any specific qualifications for making such a 
determination—and, even more alarming, that she had met the Husband only once, 
during an intake application process for ACAFS services—she quickly complied and 
appeared in the commissioner's court with a letter that stated that she believed Husband
 ( 
was insincere in his desire to care and nurture his children during the day, that she 
thought he was probably "posturing" and "strategizing" and that she recommended 
extended daycare over father care. Years later, at trial, Ms. Jensen reversed her opinion 
and offered that Husband was "absolutely sincere" in his efforts to care for his children 
(TT5at477). < 
The Wife in this case also solicited a letter, and later submitted a letter, from the 
director of Adventure Time Daycare, enlisting another third-party that stood to reap tens 
i 
of thousands of dollars in revenues from enrollment of the parties' children. Predictably, 
Adventure Time gladly joined the judicial proceedings and offered a letter to support the 
Wife. This daycare facility consequently garnered tens of thousands of dollars in 
revenues from the parties in this case over the span of almost three years, even as the 
Husband was available, and desiring to care for his children in his own home, less than
 { 
1.5 miles from the Wife's home. 
1 0 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Wife also used the rationale that extended daycare at Adventure Time was 
necessary because the exchanges at ACAFS were too difficult to coordinate in allowing 
Husband to provide father care. (TT5 403-5). This is not just the tail wagging the dog, it 
is the flea wagging the tail that is wagging the dog. In this fashion, third party services 
provide a cascading enlistment of further third party services, which in this case, have 
resulted in tens of thousands of dollars of fees for Husband, who has made less than 
$25,000 a year, every year, since being laid off in 2007. 
In its ruling, the trial court stated 
Now, what made this case difficult is its long history. For me, as the Judge, it?s~ 
it's just almost had too much history and it's very hard to sit up here and--and sort 
through 300 exhibits and be really on top of all the history, so, I acknowledge that 
I perhaps am deficient in knowing what you know about the peculiars and the 
history, but I've tried to be attentive to them. 
(TT6at805). 
Husband acknowledges that the trial court did not have an enjoyable task of 
having to examine the long history of the case. But Husband argues that the trial court's 
decision to not to consider the actual causes and violations to parenting time orders and 
simply deferring to financially-interested, uncredentialed, third parties for its 
determinations was the wrong course. Better, the trial court could have noted that almost 
all the conflict in this case was actually rooted in third-party enlistment and perverse 
incentives to keep Husband from watching his children. 
While one might think that a trial court that admits to not knowing the facts would 
attempt to divide the issues equitably among the parties in a divorce, this trial court used 
its lack of will in exercising discretion to issue a wholesale denial of Husband on almost 
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all issues, which resulted in the Husband suffering egregiously inequitable burdens and 
casting him immediately into impecuniosity. ( 
V, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GROUPING PRIVATE 
KINDERGARTEN COSTS WITH DAYCARE COSTS AND ORDERING 
i 
THE HUSBAND TO PAY FOR SUCH FEES. 
Standard of Review: Abuse of Discretion 
i 
For this issue, Husband challenges both the adequacy of the factual findings and 
conclusions of law, and the discretion used by the trial court in issuing its ruling. 
• » 
A. Adequacy of Factual Findings and Conclusions of Law < 
Because private kindergarten was treated the same as daycare costs, the same 
inadequacies detailed in the previous argument are applicable to this issue. 
B. Abuse of Discretion 
In making its award to the Wife, the trial court awarded "Adventure Time" costs 
of $5000. Although the trial court characterized these costs as "daycare" costs, this was < 
not an accurate representation. In fact, this amount partially represents tuition paid for all-
day private kindergarten. 
During the trial, the kindergarten teacher for Adventure Time Daycare, Carol Earl, 
testified to about her private kindergarten class. (TT4 at 311). There is no dispute that the 
i 
Wife unilaterally enrolled the parties' daughter in this all-day private kindergarten class 
at Adventure Time. The record also shows that the Husband took numerous measures and 
efforts to enroll the daughter in public kindergarten and to provide care for her at all other
 ( 
times she would not be in school. 
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The trial court abused its discretion in the same manner as previously identified in 
the extended daycare issue, except that it did so to an even greater extent because there is 
no basis in law for compelling payment from parents for private school. The parties 
obviously had no stipulation to such. The Husband was in obvious financial distress. And 
the trial court obviously failed to make these considerations or make any sort of 
reasonable judgment on the issue. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN LIMITING HUSBAND'S RIGHT OF 
FIRST REFUSAL TO PERIODS OF SURROGATE CARE LONGER 
THAN THREE (3) HOURS. 
Standard of Review: Abuse of Discretion 
For this issue, Husband challenges both the adequacy of the factual findings and 
conclusions of law, and the discretion used by the trial court in issuing its ruling. 
The ruling of the trial court completely disregards the principles in the statute 
governing the issue, Utah code 30-3-34: 
Parental care shall be presumed to be better care for the child than surrogate care 
and the court shall encourage the parties to cooperate in allowing the noncustodial 
parent, if willing and able to transport the children, to provide the child care. Child 
care arrangements existing during the marriage are preferred as are child care 
arrangements with nominal or no charge. 
Further, the ruling perversely promotes continued surrogate care, as the parties 
children would now need to continue attending paid daycare after school until 6:30 p.m. 
at night, just as the Wife compelled the daughter to do each day after school for her entire 
first grade year. Because the children are excused from school at approximately 3:20 
p.m., they would be shuttled to a daycare facility upon leaving school and remain there 
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until 6:30 p.m., without any parental care for the entire day, everyday, from early 
morning until night ( 
Again, this was the case with the parties' daughter for her entire first grade year. 
Husband would drive down to see his daughter on a daily basis as she would be excused 
< 
from her school, and, though intensely desiring to care for her in his home, he was 
afforded only the time to accompany her to the daycare shuttle, where she was taken to a 
daycare facility to be supervised by two young men until night time, where she was 
picked up, given dinner, and put to bed by 8:00 pm, giving her approximately only one or 
two hours of parental care each school day. , 
There is no reasonable basis for requiring the parties' children to not enjoy 
parental care on school days. 
i 
VII. THE TRIAL COURT DISTURBED THE PARTIES STIPULATION 
REGARDING DAYCARE USE IN THE FUTURE. 
Standard of Review: Question of Law { 
In its ruling, the trial court stated that Wife may use "Adventure Time" Daycare 
with no restrictions in the future. 
However, on April 16, 2009, the parties stipulated to the following point regarding 
any daycare facility that would be used in the future: 
i 
Your Honor, another provision that will apply later down, but I'm going to 
read it here so that I don't lose it is that both parties shall be listed as 
primary contacts for the children at day care, school and~and both parents 
will not prohibit the other one from picking up or dropping off the children 
at school or day care. < 
(TT2at46). 
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It is clear that the parties stipulated that whichever facility is to be chosen must 
allow both parties privileges of being primary contacts and to pick up and drop off their 
own children. 
But this was not the case with Adventure Time for nearly two years. Wife enlisted 
personnel at the daycare for support in the parties' proceedings in May 2007, as a third-
party and as stakeholder in the trial court's decision of denying father care and awarding 
daycare fees. The daycare facility obliged Wife and issued a letter of support for her 
position and denied husband access to the children, even during Husband's parenting 
time, per Wife's request.13 
Further, Sara Earl, Director of Adventure Time, and "rebuttal" witness for Wife, 
testified that their facility, per policy, only allows one (1) primary contact to authorize 
pick ups and drop offs. This is an important point because in this case, the primary 
contact (Wife) repeatedly barred Husband, as well as others in his family or ward, from 
picking up or dropping off his own children in order to deny him his parenting time. 
The trial court's decision to allow the Wife to continue to use Adventure Time 
Daycare must be contingent upon Adventure Time's policies allowing both parties to be 
listed as primary contacts and upon allowing both parties full access to their children at 
all times. 
13
 It is not known by Husband if the trial court reviewed the pleadings or the record 
showing Wife's repeated denials of parenting time for the Husband, but Wife herself 
testified during the trial that she denied Husband parenting time by keeping children in 
daycare on at least one occasion. 
/ia 
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The trial court also fails in adequately providing findings of fact and conclusions 
of law on this matter. 
VIII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING SUMMER PARENTING 
TIME FOR HUSBAND THAT IS INCONSISTENT WITH UTAH CODE 
§30-3-35(2)(e)(ii)(B). 
Standard of Review: Question of Law 
Utah Code, Annotated §30-3-35(2)(e)(ii)(B) provides specific times for non-
custodial14 parents to begin and end summer parenting time. The parties' Divorce 
Order states that such times should be pursuant to this statute, but then provides 
specific times that contradict with the statute and which substantially restrict 
Husband's time with his children during the summer days. 
A. Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment 
The substance of this argument was presented to the trial court with a timely 
motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. This motion is on the record, as is Wife's Memo in 
Opposition and Husband's Reply. The motion was barred by reason of res judicata, 
which Husband also appealed. Husband asserts that the motion was wrongfully denied. 
(R. 2231; Add. Doc. 5) 
14
 Although Husband holds joint-physical custody, he was apportioned his extended 
parenting time according to the label of "non-custodial" parent simply as a matter of 
convenience in referencing the time between the parties in the context of Utah Code § 30-
3-35. 
AA 
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B. Contradicting Parenting Times 
Utah Code §30-3-35 provides the following times for summer parenting time of non-
custodial parents: 
30-3-35(2)(a)(i)(C) at the election of the noncustodial parent, if school is not in 
session, one weekday from approximately 9 a.m, accommodating the custodial 
parent's work schedule, until 8:30 p.m. 
30-3-35(2)(b)(i)(C) at the election of the noncustodial parent, if school is not in 
session, on Friday from approximately 9 a.m., accommodating the custodial 
parent's work schedule, until 7:00 p.m. . . 
However, the Divorce Order restricts Husband's summer parent time, such that it begins 
at 6 p.m. and ends the next morning at 9 a.m.15 (R. 2268; Add. Doc. 3, ^  19-20). 
C. Applying the Statute 
The statute clearly states that the summer parenting time should begin at 9 a.m., 
giving the "non-custodial" parent the entire day to spend with his or her children. 
Because the Divorce Order expresses the start time at 6 p.m., which is nine (9) hours later 
than the statutory time, Husband is effectively denied daytime summer activities with the 
children. Husband's time is limited to dinner, sleep, and returning the children to ACAFS 
for exchanges the next morning at 9 a.m. (which is the statutory time to begin, not end, 
summer parenting time days). 
D. Intent of the Statute 
Husband asserts there is little ambiguity with the statute on this matter. However, 
if any ambiguity exists, Husband refers to the language of the Utah Supreme Court for 
15
 Husband's parenting time includes overnights during the week; the start and end times 
are to be governed by this statute. 
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such questions. It has stated that its "goal is to evince the true intent and purpose of the 
Legislature." See Anderson v. Bell, 2010 UT 4719, 234 P.3d, 1147. 
Husband asserts that the obvious intent of the legislature to begin summer parent 
time early in the day is to maximize the opportunity for the parent to participate in 
summer time, outdoor activities with children. As Utah's winter climate is not conducive 
to activities such as biking, running, playing baseball and soccer, or fishing, the 
legislature has provided summer parenting time for such activities during the day. 
Husband is currently limited to the activities of eating dinner and sleeping during 
these summer parent time sessions. Even during the winter months, or the school year, 
Husband's starting time begins in the early afternoon. It is against the intent of the statute 
to keep Husband from participating in summer time activities with his children. 
Husband asserts that the trial court also fails in adequately providing any findings 
of facts and conclusions of law, or any language whatsoever, for why this matter should 
not follow the express times in the governing statute. 
IX. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY DENIED HUSBAND'S REQUEST 
THAT WIFE PAY HALF THE MORTGAGE PAYMENTS/CREDITS ON 
THE MARITAL HOME WHEN IT WAS VACANT. 
Standard of Review: Abuse of Discretion 
The trial court denied Husband repayment or credit for half the mortgage 
payments on the marital home during the months when he could neither sell the home nor 
find renter's for it. The record shows that the trial court made this decision because it 
Af, 
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was unpersuaded that [the Husband's decision to leave the home] was appropriate 
and I think it was ill-advised that the respondent also chose to leave the home and 
then determined to command the administration of the home by renting the home 
for amounts less than would cover the mortgage. 
(TT6 at 809). 
Earlier in the proceedings, the trial court also denied an exhibit that included an 
email from Wife to Husband about the sale of the home. Husband's counsel declared that 
the exhibit had been produced and submitted according to rules but the trial court denied 
it. Husband then testified that the message included the declaration by Wife, just four (4) 
days after her unannounced departure from the home, that she would do nothing to help 
sell the home. (TT5 at 658-660). 
Husband has asserted this was the only communication that Wife ever provided to 
him regarding the marital home in the nearly seven (7) months before the home was 
rented, and that Wife refused to cooperate or communicate in any fashion on the issue. 
Wife produced no evidence at trial that she ever made any efforts to sell the home or 
cooperate in any way to sell the home. Both parties' names were listed jointly on the title 
to the marital home. Husband further asserted that he put the home up for sale by owner 
within three weeks of Wife leaving the home. 
On or about February, 2008, the parties attended a hearing to discuss selling the 
marital home. Husband agreed to vacate the house of its renters. Husband was 
specifically assigned to list the home. Husband subsequently provided notice to renters 
and listed the home for sale with Fidelity Realty, and provided notice to Wife of relevant 
details. (TT6 at 389). Wife's counsel then sent correspondence, after the home was listed, 
AH 
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mischaracterizing the agreement of listing the home, suggesting that Mr. Brandon 
Weekes be named the realtor of the home.16 
A. Equitable Considerations 
The trial court abused its discretion because it considered only the economic 
situation of the parties at separation. The trial court failed entirely to consider any 
economics of the parties at the time of trial. The trial court explained that "at the time of 
separation, the respondent was earning much more than he does today." (TT6 at 809). 
In the time between separation and trial, Husband lost his job, his premarital 
savings, his 40IK account, his Roth 401k account, all his retirement funds, his personal 
stock savings, all of his assets, his solvency, and his health. For almost two years, 
Husband was obliged to pay child support amounts that often approximated or exceeded 
his gross income.17 Husband was also assigned to carry more than $13,000 in marital 
debt in the temporary orders. Husband was forced to take loans from family members for 
tens of thousands of dollars to meet all of his obligations. 
B. Asset Responsibility 
In making its determination, the trial court abused its discretion by using the 
rationale that the "last person holding the bag is responsible." This is not an acceptable 
standard by which to make equitable marital distributions. The trial court failed to 
consider that Husband was completely unapprised of Wife's departure from the home 
16
 In trial, Mr. Weekes identified himself as an investor of distressed properties and as a 
real estate agent. (TT 4 at 190). Husband asserts that Mr. Weeke's missed opportunity for 
commissions on the parties' home likely had an effect on his testimony at trial. 
17
 Although the trial court acknowledged this by awarding a retroactive credit for child 
support, it failed to include it in any analysis distributing the marital assets. (R. 2268). 
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with the parties' children, and that the move resulted in almost no visitation for Husband 
to his children (TT5 at 413). 
Further, the trial court failed to consider that as a marital asset, both parties have 
responsibility for cooperating in maintaining it or disposing of it until one party is 
designated to do so by the trial court. The trial court failed to consider that Wife 
completely shunned every attempt to cooperate or maintain the asset. 
Husband produced mortgage payments on an empty marital home for many 
months before he was even assigned to do so by the temporary orders. And he did so 
despite being the party that did not initiate the circumstances. Husband also provided 
mortgage payments on the marital home after the renters left it in April 2008, until 
September, 2008. In all, Husband made at least ten (10) payments on the marital home 
while it was empty. In some cases, Husband made such payments while maintaining 
child support payments equal or greater to his gross income. 
Most important, the trial court failed to consider that Husband made all these 
payments at great personal cost to himself, which he could have avoided by simply 
letting the home go into foreclosure and filing bankruptcy. Such a move would have 
yielded Husband at least $25,000 in a homestead exemption. But Husband did not do so 
because he wished to maximize the asset for both parties, including the Wife. 
If Husband had made such a move, Wife would have also received only $25,000 at 
maximum, as well, or she could have lost out on any sums altogether, as her economic 
condition never qualified her for bankruptcy. As it turned out, Wife received much more 
than $25,000 as a result of the sale of the home, in addition to the awards related to it. 
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The Respondent, after trial, judgment, and attorney fees, was left with no monies from 
the home whatsoever and became impecunious. 
Husband also asserts that the trial court's decision on this matter lacks 
completeness in findings of facts and conclusions of law. 
X. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING WIFE $3500 FOR A 
PURPORTED "DISSIPATION" OF THE MARITAL HOME ASSET. 
Standard of Review: Abuse of Discretion 
In determining the Wife's request that she be awarded sums for dissipation of the 
marital home asset, the trial court stated that 
we also have the question of the carpet, which is a mixed discussion, given the age 
of the—of the carpet and other events, I'm persuaded to treat the set off, the 
allowance, the carpet allowance of $7000 to be shared equally by the parties . . . so 
the sum of $7000 should be shared . . . . 
(TT6at810). 
However, in the Divorce Order from the trial, Wife's counsel expressed the ruling 
with the following language: 
Regarding the claims of the reduction of the marital assets pursuant to the carpet 
allowance, and other related expenses, Petitioner shall receive $3500 from Respondent's 
share of the equity in the marital home. 
(R. 2268; Add. Doc. 3, 1f 30). 
Husband objected to the form of the order when this language was originally 
submitted, but the objection was over-ruled. Husband asserts that the language of the 
ruling—that any dissipation would be "shared" by the parties—suggests that there 
should not be any award. Husband requests that this question be considered upon appeal. 
zn 
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It is not disputed that the marital home sold for $230,000 in October of 2008. (TT1 
at 21). The home was appraised in June of 2007 for $270,000, by a certified appraiser, 
(when renters had been in the home for more than a year). 
It is also not disputed that Wife provided almost no resources for the marital home 
after she abandoned it, but reaped all the benefits of such. It is also not disputed that Wife 
never purchased new carpeting for the home. Further, it is not disputed that the carpeting 
in the marital home was original to the home when it was built in 1994, making the 
carpeting more than 14 years old. 
It is also not disputed that the removal of some carpeting from the home (the basis 
for which she claimed an award) was actually performed by her or at her direction. (TT6 
at 390). This was the only effort Wife made toward the marital home asset after leaving 
it. It is not disputed that Husband made many repairs and spent many long hours caring 
for and maintaining the marital home. 
The trial court's ruling that the home had dissipated in value was determined 
without reasonable analysis. First, the trial court failed to recognize that the marital home 
was in the same shape when it was sold as when it was appraised. The home had the 
same renters and was in the same condition. 
Further, the trial court failed to account for the worst housing depreciation market 
in the history of the United States and Utah, commencing from a high in the summer of 
2007 (when the home was appraised) and continuing well into the period when the home 
was sold. 
In November 2008, CNNMoney.com reported 
^ 1 
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The S&P Case-Shiller Home Price national index recorded a 16.6% decline in the 
third quarter compared with the same period a year ago. That eclipsed the previous 
record of 15.1% set during the second quarter. 
(Add. Doc. 6,1| 2). 
In figuring the unavoidable depreciation on the marital home, due to our country's 
housing market, at a rate of 16.6%, the sales price of the home should have depreciated 
by $44,820 and the final sales price should have been approximately $225, 180.18 Instead, 
the actual sales price of the home was approximately $230,000. Therefore the marital 
home did not actually "dissipate" at all, but in fact appreciated against home sales trends. 
It is not expected that the trial court can be apprised of all real estate prices and 
issues, but it would be difficult to find an American who was not aware that home prices 
depreciated substantially during the very period that the parties sold their home. Such a 
factor must be included in a reasonable determination on this issue. 
Husband also asserts that the trial court failed to provide a sufficient basis in its 
findings for awarding dissipation. 
XI. THE COURT ERRED IN REGULATING HUSBAND'S SPEECH WITH 
HIS ECCLESIASTICAL LEADERS AND EMPLOYERS.. 
Standard of Review: Question of Law 
The Divorce Order contains the following provision: 
18
 In opening arguments, Wife asserted that there was a "$40,000 difference between the 
list price" (which was the same as the appraisal price in June 2007) and "the sales price." 
(TT 1 at 21). Husband concurs. The difference is that Wife asserts that the difference was 
due to failings on the part of Husband. Husband asserts that the difference was the same 
as it was for all other home price declines and foreclosures at the time—the US and local 
housing market. 
m 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"The parties shall also be mutually restrained from making derogatory remarks about the 
other party to his or her fellow employees, employers, and/or ecclesiastical leaders." 
(Add. Doc. 3,150). 
Husband asserts that this proscription on the parties' speech violates the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution, specifically as it infringes on the parties' 
freedom of speech. The First Amendment states: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of 
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances. 
Husband emphasizes that he is appealing the limitation on speech only in contexts 
when children are not around and when speaking with employers, employees, and 
ecclesiastical leaders. Husband declares that he has never spoken in a disparaging manner 
about Wife at any time when the children have been in his care; nor has he spoken in 
such a manner at all, except in specific contexts of defending himself from false 
accusations. In fact, Husband welcomes limitations on speech even when not providing 
care for the children and in all contexts except one: defending himself against false 
accusations. 
Husband asserts that he has suffered serious wrongs over numerous years from 
false accusations made by Wife and Wife's counsel. Further, if the trial court has ever 
permitted Husband to attempt to show such wrongs, even in a partial manner, it has 
demonstrated that it is satisfied to let Wife make further accusations as a basis for making 
previous false accusations. (TT5 at 408-9). 
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Husband relies upon an ecclesiastical endorsement for his employment and full 
privileges of membership in his religion. Husband merely asserts his right to disabuse 
those who have been previously prejudiced by false accusations made about him. 
Husband does not intend to make any derogatory remarks even in these contexts; 
however, Husband should not be legally liable for interpretations of such. 
XII. THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES FOR THE 
WIFE IN THE AMOUNT OF $4000. 
Standard of Review: Abuse of Discretion 
A. Inadequate Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law 
The trial court failed to adequately present its findings of facts and conclusions of 
law on this matter. The trial court has failed to provide the detail, the logic, the 
connections to evidence, and the analysis necessary to make this determination. 
B. Abuse of Discretion 
The trial court erred in not considering the financial status and the likely financial 
results of the parties in awarding any attorneys fees from the trial. 
C/l 
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CONCLUSION 
Husband requests that this Court reverse and remand on all issues presented 
herein. If applicable, Husband requests this Court also provide its own awards or 
remedies that it deems prudent. Husband further requests costs for transmission of the 
record and other expenses of this appeal. 
DATED this ;„ 2\ day of April, 2011. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing AMENDED BRIEF OF APPELLANT was 
sent via first class mail, postage prepaid, on the ^1 day of April, 2011 to: 
Ron D. Wilkinson 
The Heritage Building 
815 East 800 South 
Orem, Utah 84097 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ANNA WIGHT, 
Petitioner/Appellee 
v. 
JOHN ANDREW WIGHT, 
Respondent/Appellant 
Case No. 20100665 
Civil No. 054401587 
ADDENDUM 
The following documents are submitted for this Addendum: 
Document 
1 
2 
3 
4 
15 
6 
Description 
Minutes of Hearing in Commissioner's Court 
Ruling RE: Affidavit of Impecuniosity 
Third Amended Findings and Order on Hearing 
Special Master Order 
Respondent's Reply Memo 
CNN Report: Home Prices in Record Decline 
Relevant Portion 
Relevant Minutes 
Entire Document 
Entire Document 
Entire Document 
Entire Document 
Entire Article 
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6ffiER 054401587 Divorce/Annulment 
r HEARING 
TAPE: 07-23-303 Both parties are present and represented by 
counsel. The parties have reached a partial stipulation. Mr. 
Wilkinson reads the partial stipulation into the record. Both 
parties are asked if they have heard, understand, and agree to be 
bound 
by the terms of the partial stipulation. Both parties say yes. The 
Court recesses at 3:21. 
COUNT: 3:38 
Court resumes at 3:38. The Court states for the record what was 
side in chambers. Both counsel confirm the accuracy of what the 
Court said concerning the conversation in chambers. Mr. Wilkinson 
presents a courtesy copy to the 
Court. Mr. Hunter objects to the letter attached to the document 
submitted to the Court. The Court will not accept the letter as to 
the truthfulness thereof, but will accept it as a statement of what 
the petitioner believed she was told. 
Mr. Hunter presents arguments. Mr. Wilkinson responds. Arguments 
continue. The Court states that the mother has the right to chose 
the school the minor children go to if the parties cannot agree on 
a school. The Court rules that the father will not 
pick up the minor children from Adventure Time, however a third 
party can pick up the minor children from Adventure Time at the 
appropriate times. The Courj^ml^^th^ not 
__i^sponsible^ar~Jaal3r the cost of Adventure' Time, ex^pE^for ^* . 
-
v
 -^ pick the~minor;35gT^re^"u^"'^ro5rday Zh-
'.;grg.' TH'e Court aTso rules the father 'may have a tMrcf p ^ 
""WeTl^hildren up from Adventure Time at 9 am during the summer as 
the older child will not be in school. The Court 
reserves the issue of the father not being able to pick up the 
children directly from Adventure Time if the respondent can provide 
proof that he has Adventure Time's permission. All other issues are 
reserved. Mr. Wilkinson is to 
prepare the appropriate order. 
26-07 Filed: Respondent's Supplemental Answers To Petitioner's First 
Set Of Discovery Requests 
26-07 Filed return: Certificate Of Service For Respondent's 
Supplemental Answers To Petitioner's First Set Of 
Interrogatories, Requests For Production Of Documents, And 
Requests For Admissions (Mailed To R Wilkinson) 
Party Served: WIGHT, ANNA 
Service Type: Mail 
Service Date: September 26, 2007 
26-07 Filed: Objection To Recommendation Of Commissioner And Request 
For Hearing With District Court Judge 
02-07 Notice - NOTICE for Case 054401587 ID 9711975 
OBJECTION TO RECOMMENDATION is scheduled. 
Date: 11/21/2007 
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FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
<lf\*f\Q Ifr Deputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ANNA WIGHT 
Petitioner, 
V. 
JOHN ANDREW WIGHT, 
Respondent. 
RULING RE: AFFIDAVIT OF 
IMPECUNIOSITY 
Case No. 054401587 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
This matter comes before the Court on Respondent's tendered Affidavit of Impecuniosity 
filed with the Court on May 12,2010. On September 1,2010, Respondent filed a Request to 
Submit. 
Having reviewed Respondent's Affidavit, being fully advised in the premises, and good 
cause appearing, the Court now makes the following ruling: 
RULING 
Having reviewed Respondent's Affidavit, the Court finds Respondent 
impecunious. 
j£ DATED this / y day of September, 2010. 
BY THE COURT r^Af-tf-M/, 
HoX Fred'DvHoward 
)istrict Court Judge 
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FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
ifzifio mc peputy 
Ron D. Wilkinson (5558) 
The Heritage Building 
815 East 800 South 
Orem,UT 84097 
Telephone: (801) 225-6040 
Facsimile: (801) 225-6041 
Attorney for Petitioner 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ANNA WIGHT, 
Petitioner, 
JOHN WIGHT, 
Respondent. 
THIRD AMENDED FINDINGS AND 
ORDER ON HEARING 
Case No.: 054401587 
Judge: Howard 
Commissioner: Patton 
This matter came before the Court, the Honorable Fred D. Howard, for trial. The 
Petitioner was present and represented by counsel, Ron D. Wilkinson. The Respondent 
was present and represented by counsel, Steve Christensen and Matt Anderson. The 
parties resolved certain issues by stipulation and the Court heard arguments at trial on the 
remaining issues. Having reviewed the file, hearing evidence and argument from the 
parties, and for good cause, the Court finds and orders as follows: 
PARENTING ISSUES 
1. There has clearly been a long and difficult history in this matter. 
r> ^ 
2. Tl roughout this time, the parties have experienced high conflict that has 
seriously deterred their ability to communicate. 
3. The Court does not question that the parties each feel intensely the love 
for the children in this matter. 
4. The Court respects both parties desire to preserve the love they have for 
the children. 
5. The Court is required, with the remaining issues, to weigh the equitable 
issues to determine what is fair. The Court's ruling is made based on what is fair and 
equitable given the circumstances. 
ACAFS - THE FAMILY ACADEMY 
6. The use of ACAFS for pick-up and drop-off of the children has been 
beneficial to the parties. ACAFS has been successful in helping the parties communicate 
and limiting any potential emotional issues occurring between the parties at pick-up and 
drop-off. The emotional issues between the parties are ample and compelling and justify 
the need for ACAFS. 
7. The parties shall continue to use the services of ACAFS for both 
calendaring and for pick-up and drop-off. If either party requests that ACAFS is no 
longer necessary, only a judge may order that ACAFS is no longer necessary. The 
requesting party must show a change of circumstances has occurred that no longer 
justifies the need for ACAFS. The Court is hopeful that ACAFS will not be necessary for 
an extended period of time. 
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RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL 
8. As provided later herein, pursuant to the stipulation of the parties, the 
parties are granted the right of first refusal, under the limits and conditions set forth 
herein. 
9. Said conditions include that, the parties will give the required notice and 
opportunity for first right of refusal, pursuant to the stipulation of the parties, if either 
party is leaving the minor children in the care of a third party for at time period equal to 
or greater than three (3) hours. 
CHILD CARE AND CHILD CARE EXPENSES 
10. The use of Adventure Time's services in this matter was helpful to reduce 
conflict between the parties and was a usual, beneficial, and appropriate form of daycare. 
11. Respondent did not offer a practical alternative to Adventure Time. His 
proposed alternatives involved too much shuffling of the children. 
12. Further, Respondent seemingly waived his complaint regarding Adventure 
Time by continuing to allow the children to attend Adventure Time. 
13. Petitioner is awarded $5,000.00 lor a portion of the costs incurred for 
Adventure Time to provide daycare for the parties minor children. 
14. Adventure Time can continue to be used for the children. 
PARENT TIME 
15. Parent time shall be as later provided herein pursuant to the parties' 
stipulated order. 
r ^ 
16. Each party may pick-up or drop-off the children at school for bis or her 
parent time consistent with Utah Code § 30-3-35 as described herein. 
17. Consistent with Utah Code § 30-3-35, when Respondent's parent time 
begins on days when the children are attending school or scheduled to attend school, his 
parent time shall begin at the end of the children's school day and he shall pick up the 
children at school at the time the children are dismissed. 
18. Consistent with Utah Code § 30-3-35, when Respondent's parent time 
ends on days when the children are attending school or scheduled to attend school, his 
parent time shall end at the beginning of the school day and he shall deliver the children 
to school at the time the children are scheduled to begin their school day. 
19. Consistent with Utah Code § 30-3-35, when Respondent's parent time 
begins on days when the children are not attending school and not scheduled to attend 
school, his parent time, which shall be overnight, shall begin at 6:00 p.m. and he will pick 
up the children at ACAFS. 
20. Consistent with Utah Code § 30-3-35, when Respondent's parent time 
ends on days when the children are not attending school and not scheduled to attend 
school, his parent time shall end at 9:00 a.m. and he shall drop off the children at 
ACAFS. 
21. The parties' parent time for all holidays shall begin and end consistent 
with the relevant time set forth in Utah Code § 30-3-35. 
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RETROACTIVE CHILD SUPPORT 
22. The Court has considered the parties' claims for retroactively paying 
and/or adjusting the parties' child support. In weighing all equities, Petitioner is awarded 
$4,632.00 for her claims for retroactive payments of child support. Respondent is 
awarded given a credit of $4,084.00 for his claims for retroactive adjustment of his child 
support obligation. With the aforementioned offsets, Petitioner is awarded a total amount 
from Respondent of $548.0 for unpaid child support. 
MARITAL HOME 
23. The Court notes in this matter that the decisions regarding the marital 
home require a substantial amount of equitable consideration. 
24. Courts generally do not criticize the manner by which people separate. 
The Court recognizes that it is usually beneficial to maintain two (2) residences after 
separation to avoid conflict, potential domestic violence, and other concerns. 
25. In the current case, Respondent made an ill-advised decision when he left 
the home and decided to rent the marital home to third parties, as well as obtain another 
residence for himself. 
26. Normally the expenses of the parties double after separation. In this case, 
the Respondent made a decision to nearly triple the expenses of the parties. 
27. Respondent could have reduced expenses by staying in the marital home. 
28. Respondent could also reduced expenses by immediately placing the 
marital home for sale. 
r "S 
29. Based on the foregoing, the Court will not give the Respondent credit for 
the payments that he made on the mortgage of the marital home and Respondent's 
request for a credit of approximately $13,000.00 reimbursement for payments he made on 
the mortgage is, hereby, denied. 
30. Regarding the claims of reduction of the marital assets pursuant to the 
carpet allowance and other related expenses, Petitioner shall receive $3,500.00 from 
Respondent's share of the equity in the marital home. 
31. There were miscellaneous expenses for the marital home paid by 
Respondent. The parties shall share the miscellaneous costs of $2,362.00, with 
Respondent receiving a credit from Petitioner for $ i, 18 i .00. 
32. The Petitioner made payments on the marital home in 2008. The 
payments that the Petitioner made for the mortgage in 2008 shall be shared equally, with 
Petitioner receiving a credit of $1,947.24. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
33. The Court has carefully considered the request for attorney fees of the 
parties in his matter. 
34. Respondent's actions and failures clearly resulted in Petitioner incurring 
substantial attorney fees. Respondent's actions and failures include the following: 
A. Repeatedly failing to timely pay his child support obligation. 
B. Repeatedly failing to timely pay his one-half (1/2) of the insurance 
premiums for the minor children. 
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C. Repeatedly failing to timely pay his one-half (1/2) of the 
uncovered medical expenses for the minor children. 
D. Repeatedly failing tc imely pay the mortgage payments he was 
ordered to maintain. 
E. Failing to timely pay for the custody evaluation fees. 
F. Interfering with the children's daycare at Adventure Time. 
35. Petitioner was required to bring multiple Orders to Show Cause because of 
said failures. 
36. Petitioner is, therefore, awarded $4,000.00 in attorney fees in this matter. 
The Court finds that the above-mentioned fees were actually incurred, the fees are 
reasonable and necessary, and the Respondent has the ability to pay the attorney fees with 
the offsets and home equity he is receiving in this matter. 
ORDER AND FINDINGS BASED ON STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES AND 
FURTHER ORDER AND FINDINGS OF THE COURT 
37. Custody: The parties shall have joint legal and joint physical custody of 
their minor childien, Jane Wight and William Wight, as further described herein. For the 
purposes of parent-time, Petitioner is, hereby, designated as the "custodial parent" and 
Respondent is designated as the "noncustodial parent." 
38. Purpose and Intent of the Parties: The parties seek to maximize the time 
each parent has with the children and to facilitate meaningful parent-time for both 
parents. To that end, living in close proximity to each other was stated to be important to 
r ~> 
the parties because proximity allows both parents to maintain and foster strong 
relationships between the children and each parent. In choosing school and other 
locations where the children will participate in activities, the above-stated purpose shall 
guide both parents' decisions. 
39. Parent Time Schedule: Petitioner will provide the primary residence for 
the children, subject to Respondent spending time with the children according to the 
following parent-time schedule: 
A. When school is in session, Respondent shall have parent-time with 
the children every other weekend beginning on Friday after school and 
ending on the following Monday. The parties were unable to resolve the 
issue of when Respondent's parent time ends on Monday. This issue was 
resolved by decision of the Court previously stated herein. 
B. When school is in session, during the week(s) Respondent has 
weekend parent time with the children, Respondent shall have mid-week 
parent-time with the children beginning on Tuesday after school and 
ending on Wednesday. The parties were unable to resolve the issue of 
when Respondent's parent time ends on Wednesday. The issue was 
resolved by decision of the Court previously stated herein. 
C. When school is in session, during the week that the Respondent 
does not have weekend parent-time, Respondent shall have parent-time 
with the children on Thursday beginning after school and ending on 
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Friday. The parties were unable to resolve the issue of when 
Respondent's parent time ends on Friday. The issue was resolved by 
decision of the Court previously stated herein. 
D. William shall attend half day kindergarten. 
E. All parent time not awarded to the Respondent shall be awarded to 
the Petitioner coasistent with Utah Code § 30-3-35 and the schedule set 
form herein. 
F. The parties shall have extended parent time with the children 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-35, 
40. Holiday Parent Time: Except as otherwise provided herein, the parties 
shall have holiday parent-time with the children pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 30-
3-35. 
A. Petitioner shall always have holiday parent time on President's 
Day, July 4th, Memorial Day, and Spring Break. Petitioner will have 
Mother's Day from 7:00 p.m. on the Saturday before the holiday until 7:00 
p.m. on the holiday. 
B. Respondent shall always have parent time on Human Right's Day, 
July 24th, Labor Day, and Fall Break. Respondent will have Father's Day 
from 7:00 p.m. on the Saturday before the holiday until 7:00 p.m. on the 
holiday. 
r >*s 
C. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-35(2)(e)(ii), Respondent 
has elected for his parent-time over scheduled holiday weekends to begin 
from the time the children's school is regularly dismissed at the beginning 
of the holiday weekend until 7:00 p.m. on the last day of the holiday 
weekend. 
41. Right of ^irst Refusal: Both parties, before leaving the children with a 
third party, shall give the other parent the first opportunity to provide care for the child. 
The parent requesting care shall email the other as soon as he/she is reasonable able after 
learning of the need for care for the children. If the notice of the need for care is less than 
24 hours from the time care is needed, notice will be given by a telephone call to the 
other parent's cellular telephone. Hie parent providing care shall pick up and return the 
children promptly. 
42. Daycare: 
A. If the need for surrogate care is ongoing and regular, such as 
during both parties* routine work day, Petitioner will choose the day care, 
subject to the Respondent's right of first refusal. 
B. If a parent is not available to care for the children when sporadic 
daycare is required, the parent who has the children in his/her care at the 
time will choose a daycare provider for the child. 
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43. Transportation and Exchanges: On school days when Respondent's parent 
time begins at the close of school, Petitioner shall drop the children off at school and 
Respondent shall pick llie children up from school. 
44. Joint Legal Custody; Joint l^ gal custody shall mean that the parents shall 
share all rights, duties, and responsibilities as parents to the minor children 
ar set fordi herein. 
A. Each parent is entitled to be reasonably informed regarding the 
children's care by nonparents, regarding the children's activities outside of 
the home and regarding timely notice of performances and public events 
involving the children. 
B. Each parent is entitled to all documentation regarding the children 
that the other parent is also entitled, including at least school and medical 
records. 
C. Each parent shall have access to all of the children's teachers, care 
providers, and health care providers. 
D. Each parent may attend and participate in all practices, games, 
church activities, scouting activities, and school activities to which parents 
are invited without regard to the parent time schedule. 
E. Each parent shall be the primary contacts for the children with 
their daycare providers), shall be allowed access to all records and 
r* ^ i 
information regarding the children from said daycare provider(s), and shall 
be allowed to pick up and drop off the children at said daycare provider(s). 
F. Each parent shall immediately notify the other of all emergency 
medical, educational, or legal events involving the children that occur 
when the children are in his or her custody, in particular any event that 
requires the children to miss more than one day of school or be treated at 
any medical facility for any reason. 
G. Each parent shall, whenever reasonably possible, notify the other 
of any scheduled medical or dental appointments that occur when the 
children are in his or her custody within a reasonable amount of time prior 
to the appointment. 
H. Each parent shall have access to the child's school and extra-
curricular schedules and each parent shall provide the other reasonable 
notice of extracurricular activities, special events (such as awards, 
presentations, and "bring your father/mother to school day'*), team sports, 
lessons, and parent-teacher activities, and share with the other the 
children's report cards, school pictures, and other significant information. 
I. Each parent shall make reasonable efforts to assist the other parent 
in obtaining the information described in this paragraph. 
J. Except otherwise provided herein, both parties shall have the right 
to have primary authority to make routine decisions regarding the 
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children's day-to-day activities and care while the children are with that 
parent. 
K. Both parties can make emergency decisions regarding the children 
when the children are in his/her care and shall timely notify the other 
parent of said emergency. 
L. Before making any non-routine decisions affecting the children 
(generally a decision which significantly affects the care or wellbeing of 
the child outside of that parent's time or requires significant effort by the 
other parent, it is considered a non-routine decision), which may include 
education, health care, extracurricular activities or religious activities 
regarding the minor children, they shall first consult each other by text or 
email regarding the decision, which means that they shall each exchange 
at least one text or email about the issue before making a decision. After 
discussing the matter, Petitioner shall have final say in making all 
decisions regarding the children, except if the parties cannot agree on a 
therapist for treatment regarding the children's mental health, the therapist 
for the children shall be determined by a Special Master, Frederick A. 
Jackman. 
M. The parties shall support each other as parents in establishing and 
enforcing consistent rules and discipline in their respective households 
r ^ 
regarding bed time, homework, lessons, school projects, and general 
conduct. 
N. The parties shall consult with each other if either of them becomes 
aware that the children are experiencing difficulties in school, emotional 
problems, or any other issues that they each would wish to be informed of 
regarding their minor children. 
O. The parties shall hold the other in high esteem in their 
conversations with the children, and encourage the children's continuing 
love and affection for both parents. In no event shall either party demean 
or disparage the other parent in the children's presence, or permit the 
children to remain in the presence of any third party who does so. 
P. Children's extracurricular activities: 
1. If the parties both agree to support the activity, the parties 
shall work together to accommodate the child's participation in the 
activity by coordinating transportation during his/her time and 
sharing the cost of the activity. The parties shall reasonably 
support music lessons and church activities. 
2. If the parties do not agree to support the activity, one parent 
can still have the child participate in the activity at his/her cost 
during his/her parent time. 
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Q. Both parties shall be entitled to reasonable telephone contact with 
the children on days they do not see the children., which shall be 
unmonitored. 
R. Both parties shall keep each other informed of his or her address 
and telephone number at all times. 
S. Each party shall notify the other whenever he or she intends to take 
the children on an overnight trip exceeding one night and provide the other 
with a travel itinerary with addresses and telephone numbers when 
reasonably available where he or she may be reached in the event of an 
emergency. 
T. Both parents shall facilitate opportunities for the other parent to 
participate in enriching activities with the children. Respondent is hereby 
given the option (when he is willing and able) to perform all church 
ordinances, which must be done by a man, for the children. Petitioner 
shall be allowed to take the children on mother-daughter and mother-son 
activities when there is not an important conflicting event with 
Respondent. Likewise, Respondent shall also be allowed to take the 
children to father-son and father-daughter activities, and to take William 
to general priesthood meeting twice each year when there is not an 
important conflicting event with Petitioner. Respondent shall be allowed 
^ ^ 
to reasonably participate with William in scouting activities that William 
participates in. 
U. The parties shall reasonably work together to coordinate sharing 
the children's homework, uniforms, clothes, and other objects that the 
children need in both homes. Clothes which go with a child to the other 
parent's house shall timely come back with the children. 
45. Communication: The parties shall communicate in writing, by email or 
text messaging unless communication is lime sensitive—then telephone communication 
can be used. The parties will treat each other respectfully and limit their discussions to 
issues related to the children. 
46. Tax Exemptions: John shall claim Jane and Anna shall claim William as 
tax exemptions. When Jane reaches majority, the parties shall claim William in 
alternating years. Both parents shall cooperate in signing the appropriate IRS forms to 
effectuate this paragraph. 
47. Costs: Statutory provisions shall apply as it relates to daycare (Utah Code 
§ 78B-12-214), insurance premiums (Utah Code § 78B-12-212), and uncovered medical, 
dental, and mental health expenses (Utah Code § 78B-12-212). Said codes are attached 
hereto and incorporated by this reference. 
48. School: If either party determines to move from Provo School District, he 
or she shall first provide 30 days notice to the other parent. 
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49. ACAFS: The parties shall use ACAFS to create a calendar for their parent 
time, for which each party will pay one-half of the cost If there is a need to change the 
calendar, they should communicate at least once via e-mail with each other before 
requesting ACAFS to act as a mediator. No provision in this paragraph gives ACAFS 
decision-making authority. 
50. Communications Regarding Other Parent: The parties shall be mutually 
restrained from making derogatory remarks regarding the other party to, or in the 
presence of, the minor children. The parties shall use their best efforts to prevent third 
parties from speaking in a disparaging manner about either parent in the presence of the 
child. The parties shall also be mutually restrained from making derogatory remarks 
about the other party to his or her fellow employees, employers and/or ecclesiastical 
leaders. 
51. Child Support: Child Support in this matter shall be pursuant to statute 
and shall be based upon the parties' incomes and the parties' stipulation regarding 
custody and parent time. Respondent's income for the purpose of calculating child 
support shall be $2,382.00 per month. Petitioner's income for the purposes of calculating 
child support shall be $5,333.00 per month. Respondent's child support obligation shall 
be $126.00 beginning May 1,2009. In one year, the Court, based upon future change of 
income, may review child support and make modifications even if there is less than a 
15% change of income. 
r "** 
52. Contempt There shall be no citation of contempt against Respondent, 
except as it relates to an award of attorney fees. All requests for contempt sanctions other 
than as it relates to an award of attorney fees shall be dismissed. 
53. Marital Home: On or about October 27,2008, the parties sold the marital 
home, which was acquired by the parties during their marriage, located at 874 East 1150 
North, Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062. The proceeds of this sale in the amount of 
approximately $42,312.26 were thereafter transferred to an account with Wells Fargo 
Bank, Account No. 339-3907724. These proceeds should be divided between the parties 
as follows: 
A. The proceeds shall be divided by the parties equally, such that each 
party will have $21,156.13. 
B. From Respondent's half of the proceeds shall be deducted the 
amount of $5,234.07 for child support related issues. This amount shall be 
added to Petitioner's share of the proceeds. 
C. From Petitioner's share of the proceeds shall be deducted the 
amount of $6,000.00 for her share of the marital debt. This amount shall 
be added to the Respondent's share of the proceeds, thereby, resolving all 
issues of marital debt, except as otherwise set forth herein. 
D. Therefore, pursuant to the calculations set forth above, Petitioner 
shall have $20,390.20 of the proceeds, $5,234.07 of which has already 
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been disbursed to her, and Respondent shall have $21,922.06 of the 
proceeds. 
E. The amount of $5,234.07 has already been disbursed to Petitioner 
from the sale proceeds for child support related issues and this amount 
shall accordingly be deducted from her $20,390.20 share of the proceeds. 
F. The amount of $3,894.47 has also been disbursed to Petitioner 
from the sale proceeds to reimburse her for mortgage payments that she 
made on the marital home. 
54. Parties* Homes: The parties shall not enter either of the other parties* 
homes without written invitation. In addition, the parties shall not go to the other's home 
without 24 hours written notice unless it is to pick up and drop off the children pursuant 
to written agreement or court order. 
55. Personal Property: Each party is hereby awarded the personal property in 
his or her possession. 
56. Special Master: Frederick A. Jackman is appointed as a Special Master in 
this matter and a Special Master Order shall issue. 
^ 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUBMIT FOR SIGNATURE 
Pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, you are, hereby, notified 
that die foregoing Order will be sent to the court for signing upon the expiration of five 
(5) days from the date of this Notice, plus three (3) days for mailing, unless a written 
objection is filed with the Court prior to that time. 
DATEDthisj^day of September 2010. 
^Ron P. ^ yfllcinson, Attorney for Petitioner 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, this ^ _ day of September 2010, a copy of the 
foregoing document to the following: 
John Wight 
1105 North 2780 West 
Provo, Utah 84601 
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Ron D. Wilkinson (5558) 
The Heritage Building 
815 East 800 South 
Orem,UT 84097 
Telephone: (801) 225-6040 
Facsimile: (801) 225-6041 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ANNA WIGHT, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
JOHN ANDREW WIGHT, 
Respondent. 
SPECIAL MASTER ORDER 
Case No. 054401587 
Judge: Fred D. Howard 
Commissioner: Thomas Patton 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. Frederick A. Jackman shall be appointed to provide intervention as a Special 
Master pursuant to Rule 53, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to resolve disputes involving parent 
time issues. This appointment is based upon the stipulation of the parties and the expertise of 
Frederick A. Jackman. The Special Master Order pertains to the following children: Jane Wight 
(D.O.B. May 23,2002) and William Wight (D.O.B. July 12,2004). 
2. The parties shall comply with the decisions made by Frederick Jackman related to 
Darent time issues. Pursuant to said anoointment and the stioulation of the carries. Frederick 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
Mo •* n.rty 
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A. Make decisions resolving conflicts between the parents relating to the 
interpretation and application of the Court's parent time orders which do not 
significantly affect the Court's exclusive jurisdiction to determine fundamental 
issues of custody and visitation. 
B. If the parties cannot agree on a therapist for treatment regarding the 
children's mental health, Mr. Jackman shall make this determination. 
3. Frederick Jackman's decisions and determinations shall be appealable to the 
Court. 
4. Frederick Jackman shall not have authority to make any decisions which 
substantially alter the parties' time-sharing arrangements, alter an award of physical custody, 
alter an award of legal custody, or substantially interfere with a party's contact with his/her 
children. No party contemplates a major re-configuration of the parties' time share arrangement. 
These decisions and others relating to the best interests of the children are reserved to the Fourth 
Judicial District Court and the State of Utah for adjudication.. 
5. Decisions of Frederick Jackman, by their very nature, are often made in 
circumstances involving severe time constraints, and possible emergencies; therefore, these 
decisions may be made orally, but in a fashion communicated directly to both parties. They are 
binding when made. In such an event, all such decisions shall be communicated to the parties by 
a confirming letter as well. 
6. The parties shall make reasonable efforts to reach an agreement with Mr. Jackman 
as to the terms and conditions of his employment, including compensation for Mr. Jackman's 
2 
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services. Petitioner and Respondent shall be equally responsible for the cost of the Special 
Master. Mr. Jackman may suspend services based upon the failures of either party to maintain 
their financial obligations to Mr. Jackman. Notice of suspension of served shall be filed with the 
Court. 
DATED this ^ d a y o i w S o i O . 
BYTHECOURT 
Approved as to f< 
Steve 
3 
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John Wight 
1105 N. 2780 W. 
Provo. UT 84601 
Telephone: (801) 375-0762 
Pro Se 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ANNA WIGHT, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
JOHN ANDREW WIGHT, 
Respondent. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM TO PETITIONER'S 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO ALTER OR 
AMEND JUDGMENT AND/OR CLARIFY 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 054401587 
Judge: Fred D. Howard 
Commissioner: Thomas Patton 
COMES NOW John Wight, Respondent, and submits this Memorandum in Reply to 
Petitioner's Memorandum in Opposition to Alter or Amend Judgment And/Or Clarify Judgment. 
FACTS 
1. The parties were married on April 14,2001. The parties have two children, ages eight and 
six. 
2. Prior to separation in 2005, Respondent provided primary care in the home from October 
2002 until September 2004. 
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3. On or about March 19,2008, the parties entered into a parent time stipulation. That 
summer, ACAFS generally scheduled Respondent's parent time to begin at noon and 
continue until 5:30 PM of the concluding day of Respondent's parenting time. 
4. On April 16,2009, the parties entered a partial parenting time stipulation that was 
essentially the same as entered in March 2008, but reserved the issue of the starting and 
ending of parenting times when school was not in session. 
5. On or about July 16,2009, this Court stated that the start and end of parent time, when 
school is not in session, is to be pursuant to statute. 
ARGUMENT 
Petitioner's memorandum does not seek to support the parenting time in question as 
consistent or pursuant to statute because it cannot factually do so. Instead, Petitioner seeks to bar 
Respondent's motion by nuscharacterizing it as a motion unrecognized by the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and by erroneously arguing that it is governed by the doctrine of res judicata. 
I. PETITIONER MISCHARACTERIZES RESPONDENT'S MOTION AND THE 
COURT'S JURISDICTION ON UTAH RULES OFCIVIL PROCEDURE 
Petitioner asserts that Respondent's motion is procedurally barred from the Court's 
consideration by calling it a "motion to reconsider," a term for which there is no recognized or 
sanctioned court rule. However, Petitioner's argument is a straw man. The Respondent's motion is 
clearly identified as a motion pursuant to Rule 52(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Respondent's motion does not ask the Court to "reconsider" the merits of the case, to hear new 
evidence, or to retry anything. It simply requests that the Court provide clarification and 
2 
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consistency in its order according to its ruling. Respondent's motion also complies with the strict 
requirements of the Rule 52 (b) in both timeliness and specificity. 
The Petitioner's own case law provides further distinction between "motions to reconsider" 
and the Respondent's timely motion. In referencing the case Tschaggeny v. Milbank Ins. Co., 
Petitioner omitted the fact that the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of "the 
motion as untimely." Tschaggeny v. Milbank Ins. Co., 2007 UT 371J14 (Utah 2007). Further, the 
motion in this case was a "motion in limine," and it was delivered "untimely," at the "last minute" 
and "on the eve of trial." Id. at %\ 7 (Utah 2007). It is in this context that the motion in this case 
was not recognized by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Petitioner also cites Gillet v. Price. However, Petitioner misreads this decision and indeed 
highlights the distinctions between "motions to reconsider" and the Respondent's current motion. 
In this case, the Utah Supreme Court repudiates "motions to reconsider" but outlines the qualities 
that distinguish such motions. First, they are "not timely." Gillet v. Price, 2006 UT 24, U 4,135 
P.3d 861 (Utah 2006). Second, they are not pursuant to a specific, court-sanctioned, recognized 
rule, and as such, they rely "upon the district courts to construe the motions within the rules." Id 
at f 8. Third—and most critical to the Court—they argue that motions meet procedural 
requirements "based upon the substance of the motions." Id at If 8. The Respondent's current 
motion bears none of these qualities. The most telling difference between the Respondent's current 
motion and the "motions to reconsider" described by the Utah Supreme Court is offered by the 
Petitioner's own argument. Petitioner states that the Respondent's motion "in substance, is a 
request to reconsider the Court's final order." See "Memorandum in Opposition To Respondent's 
3 
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Motion To Alter or Amend Judgment And/Or Clarify Judgment'5 (emphasis added). While the 
Utah Supreme Court repudiates the practice of examining the substance of a motion to accept it 
procedurally, Petitioner argues that the Court should examine the substance of the Respondent's 
motion to deny it procedurally. This turns the Utah Supreme Court's decision on its head. 
H. RESPONDENT'S RULES-SANCTIONED MOTION IS NOT PART OF A NEW 
SUIT AND RES JUDICATA IS NOT APPLICABLE. 
The Petitioner's argument that res judicata bars Respondent's motion is not on point. 
Respondent is not asking the Court to change the law of the case, but to clarify what that law is. 
To assert that motions pursuant to Rule 52(b) are barred by res judicata is to assert that orders 
must always be perfect, that no problems with orders must ever occur, and that Courts do not have 
jurisdiction to clarify, make consistent, or address problems in court orders. Respondent's motion 
does not invoke the operations inherent in new suits or reconsiderations of the Court. It seeks only 
to make clear and consistent the connecting thread between findings, conclusions of law, 
judgments, and orders. 
In the case law cited by Petitioner, the parties brought new suits, seeking to submit new 
evidence, to retry the merits of the cases, years after the finality of prior suits. Yet both cases were 
"reversed and remanded" because the courts "erred" in applying res judicata when they should not 
have. Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 408-410 (Utah App. 1990). Madsen v. BorthicK 769 P.2d 245,247 
(Utah 1988). Petitioner cites the tests for the doctrine of res judicata, yet provides no argument, 
other than mere assertions, as to how Rule 52(b), by its very definition and nature, violates the 
4 
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doctrine of res judicata and is thereby barred by it. Surely the entire dismissal of a recognized rule 
of civil procedure requires some explanation. 
ffl. AMBIGUITY IN THE ORDER HAS ALREADY CAUSED ERROR WITH THIRD 
PARTIES AND IS LIKELY TO CAUSE FURTHER CONFUSION. 
Petitioner acknowledges that the existing ambiguity referenced in Respondent's motion 
has already caused ACAFS, being the third party that is perhaps most familiar with the orders in 
question, to misinterpret the order and issue calendars accordingly. Other third parties may 
misinterpret the order based on the same ambiguity. The remedy is very brief, requiring only the 
words 'these times refer to pick up and drop off times only and not to overnights." 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, and because Petitioner has found no argument to support the 
summer exchange times in the current form of the order as statutory, nor rebutted the arguments 
clearly showing the times as inconsistent with clear, positive law, Respondent requests that this 
Court grant the Respondent's motion or afford a hearing on the matter. 
n^  
DATED this r*» day of July, 2010. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing REPLY MEMORANDUM TO PETITIONER'S 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT AND/OR CLARIFY JUDGMENT 
i l * 
was sent via first class mail, postage prepaid, on the I ** day of July, 2010 to: 
Ron D. Wilkinson 
The Heritage Building 
815 East 800 South 
Orem, Utah 84097 
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Home prices in record 
decline 
A Case-Shiller survey shows a 16.6% annual decline in 
the summer months as the housing picture continues to 
deteriorate. 
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By Les Christie, CNNMoney.com staff writer 
Last Updated: November 25, 2008: 3:23 PM ET j/m (JARN MORE 
NEW YORK (CNNMoney.com) - The home price plunge stayed on a record pace this summer, 
according to a widely watched gauge of national real-estate markets released Tuesday. rm 
TAKE CHARGE* ±±>*£ji 
The S&P Case-Shiller Home Price national index recorded a 16.6% decline in the third quarter 
compared with the same period a year ago. That eclipsed the previous record of 15.1% set during 
the second quarter. 
Prices in Case-Shiner's separate index of 10 major cities fell a record 18.6%, while its 20-city index 
dropped a record 17.4% 
With foreclosures soaring at record rates, the economic picture dimming and job losses ramping up, 
all the elements were in place to push prices lower. 
"The turmoil in the financial markets is placing further downward pressure on a housing market 
already weakened by its own fundamentals," said David Blitzer, Standard & Poor's spokesman for 
the indexes, in a press release. "All three aggregate indices, and 13 of the 20 metro areas, are 
reporting new record rates of decline...Prices are back to where they were in early 2004." 
The 10-city index is now 23.4% off its peak price, which came in June 2006; the 20-city index is 
down 21.8% from its July 2006 high and the national index has fallen 2 1 % since the third quarter of 
2006. 
Home prices in the 10-city index have fallen for 26 consecutive months. The decline has broadened 
over the past 12 months, with prices dropping in every city of the 20-city index during September. 
In the weakest market, Phoenix, the 12-month loss came to 31.9%. Las Vegas prices plummeted 
31.3% and San Francisco recorded a 29.5% decline. The best performing markets, Dallas and 
Charlotte, N.C., still posted drops - 2.7% in Dallas and 3.5% in Charlotte. 
With San Francisco and Las Vegas, the other members of the 10-city index are: Miami, down 
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28.4% year-over-year; Los Angeles, down 27.6%; San Diego, down 26.3%; Washington, down 
17%; Chicago, down 10.1%; New York, down 7.3%; Boston, down 5.7%; and Denver, down 5.4%. 
In addition to Phoenix, Dallas, Charlotte and the cities in the 10-city index, the 20-city index is made 
up of: Detroit, down 18.6%); Tampa, Fla., down 18.5%; Minneapolis, down 14%; Seattle, down 
9.8%; Atlanta, down 9.5%; Portland, Ore., down 8.6%; and Cleveland, down 6.4%. 
Foreclosures continue to take a heavy toll, with sales in some cities dominated by properties 
repossessed by banks and then put back on the market, often at bargain prices. In Las Vegas and 
Cleveland, for example, about half of all homes for sale are bank-owned properties, according to 
the real estate Web site, Trulia.com. 
"Foreclosures are clearly a part of the market now," said Blitzer. 
He added that the national index price trends tend to be more moderate because they encompass 
many more exurban and rural areas, where, in many cases, home prices never skyrocketed as they 
did in some of the hotter, urban markets. 
Karl Case, the Wellesley economics professor who is the Case in Case-Shiller, said during a news 
conference about the latest index report that he would hesitate to put a number on how much 
further prices could fall, but the increasing job losses will surely worsen the situation. 
"There's no cushion against unemployment," he said. 
And Pat Newport, an economist with Global Insight, pointed out that the latest numbers don't even 
capture the impact of some of the events of the past couple of months. 
"The real economy took a sharp turn for the worse towards the end of the third quarter," he said. 
"Since then, housing permits are down, the National Association of Home Builders index of activity 
dropped to a record low in November and purchase loan applications were down 15%. That's telling 
us the housing market has worsened a lot." 
Add to that a jumping unemployment rate and more bank woes and it portends lousy home price 
numbers for months to come, according to Newport. 
"As bad as the latest Case-Shiller numbers appear to be, they are bound to get a lot worse," he 
said. • 
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